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The idea of whether or not the shareholders of public firms should 
obtain access to the firms’ proxy materials has been controversial 
in the United States.  The continual disagreements surrounding 
proxy access reforms demand the necessity of looking at other 
countries that already allow shareholder access to a company’s 
proxy.  This article aims to explore the concerns and issues of 
shareholder proposal rights for corporate elections and 
shareholder access in South Korea and to provide considerations 
for an improved regime.  Towards this end, this author conducted a 
case study of the shareholder proposals of public firms listed on the 
Korea Exchange over the periods 2007 through 2009.  The analysis 
of the data suggests that shareholder proposals for director 
nominations have seldom been exercised for large public firms, 
especially chaebols—the large, family-controlled Korean corporate 
groups.  Consequently, the current standards for a gradated 
shareholder eligibility requirement should be reconsidered, thus 
enabling shareholder nomination rights to function as an effective 
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means to control agency problems in large public firms.  Having 
cumulative voting systems and voting restrictions in auditor 
elections entail greater risks that directors or auditors representing 
special interests may be elected through shareholder nominations.  
In particular, considering the relatively large number of 
unsupported auditor nominations, a stricter requirement for auditor 
candidate nominations might mitigate the disadvantages of 
frivolous auditor nominations.  In terms of nominating purposes, 
more than half of shareholder proposals were found to be utilized 
for the purpose of pursuing takeovers of control rights in South 
Korea, where there is no limitation on the number or qualification 
of directors to be nominated by shareholder proposal rights.  This 
invites a reexamination of the proper scopes of shareholder 
nomination rights in conjunction with shareholder proxy access, 
depending upon the size of nomination.  On the other hand, the fact 
that nominating shareholders frequently conduct a separate proxy 
solicitation shows that the current regime does not provide a 
sufficiently effective method for nominating shareholders.  Future 
studies should include the effects of the exercise of shareholder 
nominations on enhancing corporate governance of the firms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will explore the status and problems of shareholder 
proposal rights that enable shareholders to nominate director and auditor 
candidates in South Korea.  In the process of examining the question of 
shareholder rights in South Korea, some consideration will be given to the 
potential implications of the Korean system for the debate on shareholder 
proposal and proxy access in the United States. 
After dropping proxy access reform twice in 2003 and 2006, the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) again 
proposed an amendment to the Federal proxy rules in June 2009, and 
finally adopted new proxy rules and amendments to facilitate shareholder 
director nominations in August 2010—or the “2010 election contest 
rule.”
1
  The SEC took this action as part of corporate governance reform 
after the financial crisis in order to expedite the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights to nominate and elect company boards of directors.  The 2010 
election contest rule aimed to empower qualified shareholders with the 
                                                 
1 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668–69 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240 & 249) [hereinafter SEC Release: 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations]. 
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right to require a company to include the disclosure of shareholders’ 
nominees for director in its proxy statement as well as the names of those 
nominees on the company proxy card.  However, Rule 14a–11 was 
vacated by United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in 2011, although the amendment to Rule 14a–8—or the “changed 
election contest rule”—remains unchallenged.
2
 
Allowing shareholders to nominate candidates at a shareholder 
meeting and obtain access to the company’s proxy statement and card 
gives shareholders the power to facilitate their franchise in order to choose 
their own agents.
3
  However, there has been controversy between groups 
of institutional investors and the business community in the U.S. over the 
benefits of the shareholder proxy access rule.
4
  In particular, members of 
the business community have been concerned that the proposed rule might 
encourage “expensive, highly contentious, and distracting proxy 
contests.”
5
  Such concerns resulted in a petition for review of the newly 
adopted Exchange Act Rule 14a–11.
6
  In contrast, many institutional 
investors supported the proposed election contest rule because it 
facilitated shareholders’ ability to exercise their fundamental right to 
nominate directors.
7
 
While controversial, this disagreement provides impetus to look at 
other countries that already allow shareholder access to a company’s 
proxy and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this type of 
system.  In this regard, it is worthwhile to take a look at the status of 
shareholder proposal rights and shareholder access in South Korea, to help 
predict possible changes that may arise from allowing shareholders some 
degree of access rights. 
This article reviews the cases of shareholder proposal rights being 
                                                 
2 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,100 (Sept. 20, 2011) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240 & 249). 
3 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 694, 696 
(2007). 
4 See generally SEC Release: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 1. 
5  Letter from Business Roundtable to the SEC (Aug. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.businessroundtable.org/letters/business_roundtable_letter_sec_facilitating_shar
eholder_director_nominations.  See generally SEC Release: Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, supra note 1, at 56,670–74 (summarizing various comments 
opposed to the SEC proposal and the argument that the proposal imposes the same rule for 
all companies regardless of recent corporate governance developments and individual 
circumstances of each firm and presenting certain opinions and conclusions about them). 
6 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 2. 
7 See, e.g., SEC Release: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nomination, supra note 1, at 
56,670–71.  See also Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Secretary of the SEC (Aug. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.cii.org/correspondenceArchive2009; Letter from International Corporate 
Governance Network to Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of the SEC, ICGN Support for 
“Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations” (Aug. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.icgn.org/letters/letter_to_sec_august_17_2009_-file_no_s7-10-09.pdf. 
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exercised with respect to the election of directors and/or auditors of public 
firms whose shares are listed (i) on the Stock Market Division, or (ii) on 
the KOSDAQ Market Division of the Korea Exchange,
8
 a unified national 
stock exchange (hereinafter the KRX), and which in 2007, 2008, and 2009 
made disclosure of their public notice to convene a shareholder meeting 
(which time period also constituted the research period for this article). 
In terms of duties, in South Korea, a statutory auditor inspects the 
directors’ performance of duties, conducts important surveillance over the 
board of directors and individual directors’ performance of their duties, 
and audits company accounts.  Considering the range of invested authority 
and the role of the auditor itself, one cannot overlook auditors when 
evaluating the status of shareholder proposal rights for corporate elections.  
For this reason, the scope of this article also includes cases where a 
nominating shareholder proposed an auditor candidate. 
This paper analyzes data hand-collected by the author from annual, 
semi-annual and quarterly reports, proxy statements, and public disclosure 
of the results of shareholder meetings.  These data are available both on 
the Korean Data Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer System (DART)
9
—an 
equivalent to the U.S. EDGAR and operated by the Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service—and the Korea Investor’s Network for Disclosure 
System (KIND)
10
—operated by the KRX.  In situations where the data 
available on DART or KIND were insufficient to yield relevant 
information, the author verified the contents, circumstances, and results of 
shareholder proposals by using the other aforementioned sources and 
media resources such as news articles. 
Based on the problems listed above, this article makes suggestions 
for enhancing the shareholder franchise and mitigating some of the 
problems that arise as a result of allowing shareholder proposal rights and 
shareholder access. 
Part II discusses the corporate elections procedure in South Korea, 
including the requirements and procedures of shareholder proposal rights 
for shareholders to nominate their candidate(s) at a shareholder meeting as 
                                                 
8 The KOSDAQ Market is a trading board of the KRX, which was established to create a 
liquidity market, mainly for venture capital firms as well as small- and medium-sized 
businesses and the IT industry.  See KRX History 1956–2010, KRX KOREA EXCHANGE, 
http://eng.krx.co.kr/m9/m9_1/m9_1_3/UHPENG09001_03.html (describing the history of 
the KRX).  The Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotations or KOSDAQ was 
established in 1996 by benchmarking the NASDAQ in the U.S.  However, the KOSDAQ 
Market became one of three market divisions of the KRX in January 2005 as a result of the 
merger among the former securities and futures markets, including the KOSDAQ.  Id. 
9 DAEHANMINKUK KIUPJUNGBOEUI CHANG, DART [REPOSITORY OF KOREA’S CORPORATE 
FILINGS, DART], http://dart.fss.or.kr/ (last visited May 6, 2012). 
10
 SANGJANGKONGSI SYSTEM [KIND, KOREA INVESTOR’S NETWORK FOR DISCLOSURE 
SYSTEM], http://kind.krx.co.kr/main.do?method=loadInitPage&scrnmode=1 (last visited 
May 6, 2012). 
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well as shareholder access to a company proxy.  This discussion includes 
an explanation of how corporate elections proceed in South Korea, and 
proceeds to point out some of the major differences between the U.S. and 
South Korea in shareholder proposal procedures for corporate elections 
for public companies. 
Part III examines cases that have been made available through 
public disclosure of shareholders who exercised their proposal rights for 
nominating director and/or auditor candidates at public corporations in 
South Korea.  In particular, this section reviews which types of 
shareholders have tended to take advantage of shareholder proposals and 
for what purpose, whether they have conducted their proxy solicitations 
separately, whether their proposals have been successful, and what 
obstacles such shareholders have faced.  Efforts are made to find out 
whether the ownership structure and the size of public companies have 
had an important effect on shareholders’ exercise of shareholder proposal 
rights, as well as on the results of these shareholder proposals. 
Part IV then discusses actions that should be taken to facilitate 
adopting shareholder proposal rights to enhance shareholders’ voting 
rights in corporate elections.  In addition, some deliberations are extracted 
from these findings that could be helpful in the course of discussing the 
corporate election rule in the U.S. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RIGHTS AND 
CORPORATE ELECTIONS 
A. Shareholder Proposal Rights in South Korea 
On January 13, 1997, in order to empower shareholders to put 
their own agenda to a vote at shareholder meetings and to mitigate 
minority shareholders’ indifference and isolation, shareholder proposal 
rights were first adopted for public firms in South Korea.
11
  Similarly, on 
December 28, 1998, South Korea enacted an additional provision to give 
shareholders of private and public firms the right to exercise shareholder 
proposal rights.
12
  As a result of the adoption of shareholder proposal 
rights, shareholders became entitled to present their director and auditor 
candidates at shareholder meetings. 
In South Korea, directors of a corporation are elected by receiving 
                                                 
11  JAECHEONGKYUNGJEWIWONHOI [COMM. OF FIN. AND ECON.], JEUNGKWONKEOLAEBEOB 
JUNG KAEJUNGBEOBYULAHN SIMSABOKOSEO  [REVIEW REPORT ON THE AMENDMENT TO THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT] 113 (1996); JEUNGKWONKEOLAEBEOB [Securities and 
Exchange Act], Act. No. 972, Jan. 15, 1962, amended by Act No. 5254, Jan. 13, 1997, art. 
191-14 (S. Kor.) (repealed 2009). 
12 Sangbeob [Commercial Act], Act No. 1000, Jan. 20, 1962 [hereinafter KCC], amended 
by Act No. 5591, Dec. 28, 1998, art. 363-2 (S. Kor.). 
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a majority of the voting shares present or represented at a shareholder 
meeting in addition to a quarter or more of the total number of issued 
shares with voting rights, unless otherwise prescribed in that corporation’s 
articles of incorporation.
13
  Auditors are also selected by majority approval 
of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting and a quarter or more of the 
total number of voting shares.
14
  However, shareholders who hold more 
than 3% of all of the voting shares may not exercise their voting rights 
corresponding to the portion exceeding 3%.
15
  In addition, if the largest 
shareholder of a public firm and its “specially-related” persons hold, in the 
aggregate, more than 3% of the entire number of all voting shares, the 
largest shareholder and those specially-related persons all together may 
not exercise voting rights exceeding 3%.
16
 
In principle, shareholders may vote in person or by proxy 
representation.
17
  Shareholders not attending the meeting may exercise 
their voting rights in writing, as long as the articles of incorporation allow 
it.
18
  Beginning from May 29, 2010, electronic voting is permitted, 
provided that the board of directors resolves to adopt it in advance of each 
shareholder meeting.
19
 
As a general practice, directors are elected mainly from the pool 
of candidates nominated by the board of directors of a corporation.
20
  Prior 
to the adoption of shareholder proposal rights, a shareholder or a group of 
shareholders holding five percent or more of the aggregate voting shares 
of a company could ask the board of directors to call a shareholder 
meeting to put his or her agenda to a vote.
21
  However, because of the 
complicated and burdensome procedure that it requires, the minority 
shareholder’s right to call a shareholder meeting has been criticized for 
discouraging dissatisfied shareholders from effectively proposing their 
                                                 
13 KCC amended by Act No. 5053, Dec. 29, 1995, art. 368, para. 1 (S. Kor.); KCC art. 382, 
para. 1 (S. Kor.). 
14 KCC amended by Act No. 5053, Dec. 29, 1995, art. 368, para. 1 (S. Kor.); KCC art. 409, 
para. 1 (S. Kor.). 
15 KCC amended by Act No. 3724, Apr. 10, 1984,  art. 409, para. 2 (S. Kor.). 
16 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-12, para. 4 (S. Kor.). 
17 KCC art. 368, para. 3 (S. Kor.). 
18 KCC amended by Act No. 6086, Dec. 31, 1999, art. 368-3 (S. Kor.). 
19 KCC amended by Act No. 9746, May 28, 2009, art. 368-4 (S. Kor.). 
20 KCC art. 362 (S. Kor.).  See Joon-Woo Chung, Jujucheahnkwoneui Hangsayokeonkwa 
Moonjejeom [Requirements for and Problems of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights], 
21 SAANGSAHBEOB YEONKOO [STUDY OF COMMERCIAL LAWS] 285, 286–87 (2002) (stating 
that, before the adoption of shareholder proposal rights, it was practically impossible for 
shareholders to propose their own agenda to a shareholder meeting without the cooperation 
of the board of directors). 
21 KCC art. 366 (S. Kor.).  Now the minimum ownership threshold has been lowered to 3% 
and, in the case of public firms, further to 1.5%, together with a six-month minimum 
holding requirement. 
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director candidates or other agendas at shareholder meetings.
22
 
According to shareholder proposal rights, a shareholder or a group 
of shareholders holding three percent or more of the total number of 
issued shares with voting rights may propose the inclusion of certain 
matters in the agenda of a shareholders’ meeting, among them, nominating 
director and auditor candidates.
23
  This will be referred to as a “general 
shareholder proposal right,” to differentiate it from the shareholder 
proposal right described below. 
In the case of a public company, a shareholder proposal right 
applies specifically to a shareholder or group of shareholders holding 1% 
or 0.5% of the company’s issued and voting shares, depending upon the 
size of its paid-in capital as of the end of the immediately preceding fiscal 
year, i.e. whether or not it exceeds KRW 100 billion.
24
  For shareholders 
to take advantage of the shareholder proposal rights at public firms that 
allow a more generous minimum ownership threshold requirement, such 
shareholders must have held the shares of the company continuously for at 
least six months at the time of their exercising shareholder proposal 
rights.
25
  This holding requirement is said to be necessary to prevent 
shareholders from abusing this shareholder proposal right, such as by 
acquiring voting shares for the sole purpose of exercising shareholder 
proposal rights.
26
  This will be referred to as a “special shareholder 
proposal right,” to distinguish it from a general shareholder proposal right. 
As a result of the co-existence of a general shareholder proposal 
right and a special shareholder proposal right, shareholders of a public 
firm may choose to exercise shareholder proposal rights under either one, 
depending on which requirements they can satisfy.  As explained above, a 
general shareholder proposal right requires a higher minimum ownership 
threshold, but does not require a minimum holding period.  Conversely, a 
special shareholder proposal right calls for a lower minimum equity 
requirement, but demands a minimum holding period of six months.  The 
shareholders of public firms may choose to exercise either of these two 
types of shareholder proposal rights, depending upon the requirements 
they meet. 
                                                 
22 See Chung, supra note 20, at 286–87 (stating that the minimum shareholding threshold 
requirement for calling a shareholder meeting was so stringent as to effectively discourage 
minority shareholders from calling such meetings, and arguing that shareholders should 
have a right to promote their own agenda at shareholder meetings, distinct from the right to 
call the shareholder meeting itself). 
23 KCC amended by Act No. 5591, Dec. 28, 1998, art. 363-2 (S. Kor.). 
24 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-6, para. 2 (S. Kor.).  According 
to the base foreign exchange rate as of December 30, 2011 (i.e. USD 1 = KRW 1,153.30), 
KRW 100 billion amounts to about USD 86.7 million.  Id. 
25 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-6, para. 2 (S. Kor.). 
26  See Chung, supra note 20, at 289–90 (stating that the shareholding requirement is 
prescribed in order to prevent the abuse of shareholder proposal rights). 
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To exercise a shareholder proposal right, the law requires a 
qualified shareholder, or a group of shareholders, to propose the inclusion 
of certain matters (such as the agenda) in a written document at least six 
weeks before a scheduled shareholder meeting, or, in the case of an annual 
shareholder meeting, six weeks before the date of the annual shareholder 
meeting in the immediately-preceding fiscal year.
27
 
The law stipulates that the director receiving a shareholder 
proposal must report to the board of directors, and the board has to include 
the shareholder proposal among the objectives of the meeting unless the 
proposal runs in contravention of law or the articles of incorporation, or 
unless it falls under other specific circumstances prescribed under the 
Presidential Decree of the Korean Commercial Code.
28
  Since the rules 
generally do not allow the exclusion of shareholder proposals relating to 
corporate elections, a qualified shareholder or group of shareholders may 
propose a set of their own candidates to the board.
29
 
The shareholder may demand that the sum and substance of their 
proposals be included with the notice and with public notice to convene 
the shareholder’s meeting.
30
  Moreover, if the proposing shareholder 
demands an opportunity to explain the proposal at the shareholders’ 
meeting, he or she must be given the chance to do so.
31
 
B. Proxy Access in South Korea 
If a person intends to solicit a proxy from a shareholder of a 
public company to exercise voting rights on the listed shares held by the 
solicitee, the solicitor has to comply with the prescribed requirements 
                                                 
27 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 363-2, para. 1 (S. Kor.). 
28 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 363-2, para. 3 (S. Kor.). 
29 See Chung, supra note 20, at 297 (indicating that a shareholder proposal right allows a 
shareholder to nominate his or her director candidates and request review and resolution of 
agendas pertaining to the electing of directors); KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 
2009, art. 363-2, para. 3; Sangbeob Sihangyeong [The Enforcement Decree of the KCC] 
No. 11485, Aug. 16, 1986 amended by Presidential Decree No. 21288, Feb. 3, 2009 
[hereinafter the Presidential Decree of the KCC], art. 5.  Article 5 of the Presidential 
Decree of the KCC lists the items excluded from a shareholder proposal right.  These items 
include cases in which:  (i) a shareholder proposes the same agenda which was rejected at a 
prior shareholder meeting held within the past three years, which failed on account of not 
obtaining support of at least 10 percent of all voting shares; (ii) a shareholder proposal 
relates to the private problem of a shareholder; (iii) a shareholder proposes the removal of 
an incumbent director or auditor from his or her office before the expiry of his or her term 
(only for public firms); and (iv) a shareholder proposal is impossible for a company to 
achieve, or the grounds for a shareholder proposal are self-evidently false or relate to 
defaming a particular person.  Id. 
30 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 363-2, para. 2  (S. Kor.). 
31 KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 363-2, para. 3 (S. Kor.). 
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under the applicable laws and regulations.
32
 
A solicitor must submit a copy of its proxy statement and proxy 
form to the Financial Services Commission (hereinafter the FSC)
33
 and the 
KRX at least five business days before the date on which the solicitor 
forwards the proxy statement and proxy form to the solicitee.
34
  The 
solicitor must send the proxy statement and proxy form to the solicitee by 
hand delivery, mail or fax, or by an electronic transmission (this last 
method is permissible only if the solicitee expresses his or her desire to 
receive these documents in electronic form).
35
  In the case where the 
solicitor is the public firm itself, the solicitor may send the proxy 
statement and proxy form to the solicitee together with the notice of a 
shareholder meeting.
36
  The law also requires the solicitor to keep the 
proxy statement and proxy form at a designated place, such as the head 
office and branch of the public firm in question, the FSC, the KRX, or an 
office of the relevant transfer agent.
37
 
The proxy statement has to lay out the agenda for the relevant 
general shareholders’ meeting of the public firm in addition to other 
detailed information regarding the solicitor and its agent.
38
  In addition, 
the proxy form needs to be formatted in such a way to enable the solicitee 
to state clearly whether the solicitee is for or against a particular agenda.  
If a certain agenda is changed or revised, the solicitee also has to state 
                                                 
32 During the research period of this article, the Securities and Exchange Act was repealed 
by the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, which took effect as of 
February 4, 2009.  The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act is a law 
comprehensively governing the securities markets, enacted to consolidate the then-existing 
Securities and Exchange Act, the Future Trading Act, the Indirect Investment Asset 
Management Business Act, the Trust Business Act, the Merchant Banks Act, and the 
Korea Securities and Futures Exchange Act.  The new law has not implemented significant 
changes affecting shareholder proposal rights and proxy access rights.  If there are any 
noteworthy differences between the old and new regulatory regimes, these will be 
specifically identified. 
33 The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is a supervisory regulator in South Korea 
equivalent to the SEC. 
34  Jabonsijangkwa Keumyoongtoojaupae Kwanhan Beobyul [The Financial Investment 
Services and Capital Markets Act] amended by Act No. 8852, Feb. 29, 2008, art. 153 (S. 
Kor.) [hereinafter the FISCMA].  The former Securities and Exchange Act required two 
days’ prior notice. 
35  Jabonsijangkwa Keumyoongtoojaupae Kwanhan Beobyul Sihangyeong [The 
Enforcement Decree of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], 
Presidential Decree No. 20947, Jul. 29, 2008 [hereinafter the Presidential Decree of the 
FISCMA], art. 160 (S. Kor.).  The method of electronic transmission has been available 
since February 4, 2009. 
36 Id. 
37  Jabonsijangkwa Keumyoongtoojaupae Kwanhan Beobyul Sihangkyuchik [The 
Enforcement Rule of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act] amended 
by Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 973, Mar. 2, 2012, art. 18 (S. Kor.). 
38 The FISCMA, Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, art. 152, para. 6 (S. Kor.); The Presidential 
Decree of the FISCMA, art. 163, paras. 1 & 2 (S. Kor.). 
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whether or not he or she will use a proxy for that agenda, as well as any 
instructions for voting his or her shares in that case.
39
  The solicitor must 
exercise the voting rights as instructed by the solicitee on the proxy form. 
The applicable statute and regulations on proxy solicitations do 
not have any specific provisions with respect to whether or not a 
shareholder has a right to ask a company to place his or her director or 
auditor candidates in a company’s proxy material for a vote at a 
shareholder meeting, if the shareholder has successfully made a proposal 
to the board.  Since a proxy solicitor is required to include all the items to 
be resolved during a shareholder meeting in its proxy card and proxy 
statement, public firms include agendas proposed by shareholders as well 
as those proposed by their own board of directors in their proxy cards 
when the public firms do proxy solicitations.  As a result, a shareholder of 
public companies in South Korea has been able to take advantage of a 
company’s ballot to seek the approval of other shareholders on his or her 
own nominees when the companies conduct proxy solicitations, regardless 
of whether shareholders have requested firms to do so or not. 
Since there is no explicit provision relating to shareholder access 
to a company’s proxy materials, the law does not require the proxy 
statement to include much information about the nominating shareholders 
or the nominating shareholder group, their relationship to nominees, and 
the purpose of their nomination.  While a company must include the 
information regarding the name, principal occupation, profile, and the 
contents of transactions between either a director or auditor candidate and 
the public company, information regarding the nominating shareholders 
and other details relating to shareholder proposals does not need to be 
included in a proxy statement. 
C. Comparison of Shareholder Proposal Rights between the U.S. 
and South Korea 
From the perspective of corporate elections, the most outstanding 
difference between the U.S. and South Korea, with regard to current 
shareholder proposal rights and proxy access, is whether or not the board 
can exclude shareholder proposals relating to corporate elections. 
In the U.S., the changed election contest rule allows a public firm 
to exclude certain shareholder proposals, such as those requesting 
inclusion of a specific individual nominee.
40
  Thus, a company may 
exclude a shareholder proposal in cases where the proposal relates to a 
nomination or an election for membership on the company’s board of 
                                                 
39 The FISCMA, Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, art. 152, para. 4 (S. Kor.); The Presidential 
Decree of the FISCMA, art. 163, para. 1 (S. Kor.).  This provision was added by the 
Presidential Decree of the FISCMA, and did not exist in the Securities and Exchange Act. 
40 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(8) (2008). 
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directors or analogous governing body, unless the company’s governing 
documents require the inclusion of shareholder director nominees in its 
proxy material.  On the other hand, shareholder proposals seeking to 
establish within a company’s governing documents a procedure for 
requesting shareholder director nominee(s) are required to be included in 
the company’s proxy materials, if proposed.  The 2010 election contest 
rule instead required companies to place certain information about 
nominating shareholders and shareholder director nominees in their proxy 
materials, under certain circumstances, as long as the shareholders sought 
to acquire a small number of seats on the board.  By contrast, in South 
Korea an eligible shareholder or a group of shareholders of a public firm 
may nominate their director or auditor candidates, and a public company 
is required to put the shareholder nominees in a company’s proxy 
materials if it does its own proxy solicitation. 
A chart of the major differences in shareholder proposal rights and 
shareholder access between South Korea and the U.S., if the 2010 election 
contest rule in the U.S. had come into effect, can be found in Table 1 
below. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Shareholder Suffrage Between the U.S. and 
South Korea (under the 2010 election contest rule) 
 
Contents U.S. South Korea 
(General) (Special) 
Eligible 
Shareholder or 
Shareholder 
Group 
1. Minimum 
ownership 
threshold (3% of 
voting power) 
1. Minimum 
ownership 
threshold (3% of 
voting power) 
1. Minimum 
ownership 
threshold (1% of 
voting power in 
the case of 
public firms 
with paid-in 
capital of less 
than KRW 100 
billion; 0.5% in 
the case of 
public firms 
with assets of 
KRW 100 
billion or more) 
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Contents U.S. South Korea 
(General) (Special) 
2. Minimum 
holding period 
(three years) 
2. Holding 
period is not 
required 
2. Minimum 
holding period 
(six months) 
Post-Holding 
Requirement 
Yes (through the 
date of the 
shareholder 
meeting) 
No explicit 
provision 
No explicit 
provision 
Number of 
Shareholder 
Nominees 
1. Up to the 
greater of (i) 
one, or (ii) 25% 
of the board of 
directors 
2. If there are 
multiple 
nominating 
shareholders or 
shareholder 
groups, only the 
nominee(s) of 
the nominating 
shareholder or 
shareholder 
group with the 
highest 
percentage of the 
voting power 
shall be included 
in a company’s 
proxy materials. 
No limitation No limitation 
Qualification of 
Nominees 
Independent 
director 
No restriction No restriction 
Deadline for 
Nominating 
Shareholder 
Candidates 
No earlier than 
150 days prior to 
the anniversary 
of the mailing of 
the prior year’s 
proxy statement 
No later than six 
weeks before a 
scheduled 
shareholder 
meeting (in case 
of annual 
No later than six 
weeks before a 
scheduled 
shareholder 
meeting (in case 
of annual 
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Contents U.S. South Korea 
(General) (Special) 
and no later than 
120 days prior to 
this date 
shareholder 
meeting, six 
weeks before the 
date of the 
shareholder 
meeting in the 
prior year) 
shareholder 
meeting, six 
weeks before 
the date of the 
shareholder 
meeting in the 
prior year) 
Nominating 
Shareholder’s 
Filing its Notice 
to the Public 
Company 
Nominating 
Director 
Candidate  
Required Not required Not required 
Information 
Included in 
Proxy Materials 
Nominating 
shareholder, 
nominee and 
their 
relationship, etc.  
Not specified 
(usually the 
name of 
nominees) 
Not specified 
(usually the 
name of 
nominees) 
Whether or not 
the Governing 
Documents of 
Public Firms 
may Prohibit 
their 
Shareholders 
from 
Nominating a 
Candidate 
Allowed Not allowed Not allowed 
 
There is a wide range of differences in shareholder rights for 
corporate elections and shareholder access between South Korea and the 
U.S. (under the 2010 election contest rule).  As a result of the rule in 
South Korea, a shareholder or a shareholder group qualified for exercising 
shareholder proposal rights may take advantage of access to a company 
ballot, and incumbent directors or managers or controlling shareholders 
may not initiate the amendment of the governing documents to prevent 
shareholders from proposing their own director or auditor candidates. 
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Shareholder proposal rights in South Korea do not limit their 
implementation to cases where shareholders are trying to send one or a 
small number of members to the board.  An eligible shareholder or 
shareholder group may propose the election of multiple directors, the total 
number of which may exceed the number of incumbent directors, unless 
there is a limitation on the number of directors in the company’s articles 
of incorporation.  In addition, shareholder nominees do not necessarily 
have to be independent directors. 
This nomination right, unrestricted in terms of number and 
qualification, may affect the purpose of exercising shareholder proposal 
rights in South Korea.  That is, it will tend to increase the possibility that 
shareholders will rely on shareholder proposal rights for corporate 
elections, often for the purpose of pursuing takeovers of control rights, as 
well as to enhance monitoring of incumbent directors and managers.  In 
this connection, as indicated above, this article will look at the purposes of 
exercising shareholder proposal rights and the types of directors 
nominated by shareholders in South Korea. 
III. ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS FOR CORPORATE 
ELECTIONS 
A. Data 
This paper uses data collected from public disclosures on 
corporate elections where shareholders of public firms have nominated 
their own director or auditor candidates.  These data are available first on 
DART and KIND and include annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports, 
proxy statements, and reports on the results of shareholder meetings.  In 
addition, in those cases where the data available on DART and KIND was 
lacking, the author collected information from other media sources to 
verify the contents and circumstances of shareholder proposal rights and 
their results at the relevant meeting. 
This article reviews cases of shareholder proposal rights exercised 
to nominate director or auditor candidates of public firms listed on the 
KRX; these were firms whose public notices to convene a shareholder 
meeting were disclosed during the research period.  During the research 
period, 6,969 public notices for convening a shareholder meeting posted 
on DART were reviewed to search for shareholder proposals including 
shareholders’ nominations of director or auditor candidates based on a 
shareholder proposal right.  The public notices on DART usually indicate 
who recommended relevant director and auditor candidates, especially the 
general type of recommender.  When those public notices did not clearly 
state whether pertinent candidates were recommended by either the board 
of directors or nominating shareholders—based on their shareholder 
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proposal right—or others, reference was made instead to public 
disclosures regarding the result of the particular shareholder meeting, and 
to news media, to figure out whether or not shareholder proposals were 
made to nominate director or auditor candidates. 
This initial research reveals that 110 shareholder proposals 
nominated director and/or auditor candidates.  The collected information 
on the 110 shareholder proposals for corporate elections in which a 
shareholder or a group of shareholders nominated their own director or 
auditor candidates is provided in the Appendix, in Table 2 (in the case of 
public firms listed on the Stock Market Division of the KRX) and Table 3 
(in the case of public firms listed on the KOSDAQ Market Division of the 
KRX) respectively.  For detailed information about how the information 
was collected and organized, see the explanation provided in the notes to 
Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix. 
The data in the following tables (Tables 4 to 17) in Part III were 
derived from Tables 2 and 3. 
B. Overview of Shareholder Proposals for Corporate Elections 
During the research period, 6,969 public notices convening 
shareholder meetings were posted.  Careful review of the agenda of each 
public notice revealed that 110 cases included shareholder proposals to 
nominate shareholders’ director or auditor candidates, and that among 
them, twenty-eight shareholder proposals were approved at a shareholder 
meeting as shown in Table 4 below.  [The shareholder proposals for 
corporate elections in question were categorized into years 2007, 2008, 
and 2009, depending on the date of the relevant shareholder meeting, 
instead of the date of a pertinent notice of the shareholder meeting.  
Hereinafter the same categorization method shall apply.] 
 
Table 4. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights for 
Corporate Elections 
 
 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Number of Public 
Firms Posting a Notice 
(1) 
1,641 1,707 1,742 — 
Stock Market (1-1) 679 686 707 — 
KOSDAQ (1-2) 962 1,021 1,035 — 
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 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Number of Public 
Firms where 
Shareholder Proposals 
were Exercised (2) 
(2/1%) 
25 
(1.5%) 
38 
(2.2%) 
28 
(1.6%) 
91 
Stock Market (2-1)  
(2-1/1-1%) 
10 
(1.5%) 
14 
(2.0%) 
11 
(1.6%) 
35 
KOSDAQ (2-2)  
(2-2/1-2%) 
15 
(1.6%) 
24 
(2.4%) 
17 
(1.6%) 
56 
Number of 
Shareholder Proposals 
Exercised (3) 
31 47 32 110 
Stock Market (3-1) 11 15 11 37 
KOSDAQ (3-2) 20 32 21 73 
Number of 
Shareholder Proposals 
Approved (4) (4/3%) 
9  
(29.0%) 
15  
(31.9%) 
4  
(12.5%) 
28 
(25.5%) 
Stock Market (4-1)  
(4-1/3-1%) 
4 
(36.4%) 
1  
(6.7%) 
0  
(0%) 
5  
(13.5%) 
KOSDAQ (4-2) 
(4-2/3-2%) 
5  
(25.0%) 
14  
(43.8%) 
4  
(19.1%) 
23  
(31.5%) 
 
Notes to Table 4: 
 
1. The number of public firms is based on the information as of the end of the 
year immediately preceding the relevant date of the shareholder meeting, 
provided by the KRX.
41
  Foreign companies, special purpose vehicles such as 
general investment companies, real estate investment companies, and ship 
investment companies are excluded from this research. 
 
2. Even if only a portion of the shareholder nominees were elected at a 
                                                 
41
 THE KOREA EXCHANGE, 
http://kind.krx.co.kr/corpgeneral/listedIssueStatus.do?method=loadInitPage (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2011). 
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shareholder meeting, such proposals are counted as approved.  In addition, the 
approved proposals also include cases where the insiders agreed to the election of 
shareholder nominees after the exercise of shareholder proposal rights, but before 
the shareholder meeting. 
 
* * * 
 
The percentage of public firms actually exercising shareholder 
proposals is around one to two percent of all public firms listed in South 
Korea. 
Traditionally, the stakeholders of Asian corporations have been 
known to prefer informal remedies outside the public eye to deal with 
their dissatisfaction.
42
  The number of exercised shareholder proposals 
alone, however, does not provide sufficient evidence to determine whether 
the adoption of shareholder proposal rights has caused a decrease in 
shareholders’ reluctance to take formal measures in South Korea.  
Nevertheless, the number of shareholder proposals for corporate elections 
under shareholder proxy access to a company’s proxy materials may be 
compared to the number of contested proxy solicitations without 
shareholder proxy access in the U.S., to at least roughly assess the 
frequency of shareholder proposals for corporate elections in South Korea. 
According to the empirical study by Buchanan, Netter and Yang, 
in each year from 2000 to 2006, forty-one, forty-three, thirty-eight, thirty-
six, twenty-seven, twenty-two and forty-two public firms, respectively, 
were subject to contested proxy solicitations in the U.S.
43
  On the other 
hand, Table 4 shows that in each year from 2007 to 2009, twenty-five, 
thirty-eight, and twenty-eight public firms, respectively, were subject to 
shareholder proposals for corporate elections.  While the period of study is 
different, and the items compared are not the same (i.e. the number of 
contested proxy solicitations in one study, versus the number of 
shareholder proposals for corporate elections in the other), the studies 
indicate that public firms in South Korea seem to be exposed to 
shareholder proposals for corporate elections quite often, especially given 
that the U.S. has more than three times the number of public firms listed in 
South Korea.
44
 
                                                 
42  See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 11–12, 30 (2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/55/25778905.pdf (noting that Asian businesses ‘often 
prefer quiet, informal dispute resolution as a way for all parties involved to ‘save face’ and 
to keep their business affairs out of the public eye’). 
43 Bonnie Buchanan, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, Proxy Rules and Proxy Practices: An 
Empirical Study of US and UK Shareholder Proposals 47 (Sept. 15, 2009) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474062. 
44 According to the World Bank Group Database, the number of listed domestic companies 
in the U.S. and South Korea, respectively, in the years 2000–08 inclusive, is as below: 
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Public firms listed on the KOSDAQ Market Division might be 
expected to be subject to shareholder proposals for corporate elections 
more frequently than those listed on the Stock Market Division, since 
relatively more firms listed on the KOSDAQ Market Division are known 
to have been involved in a number of corporate scandals.
45
  Additionally, 
shareholders have an easier time acquiring an eligible amount of voting 
rights for exercising shareholder proposal rights due to the relatively 
smaller size of these firms’ market capitalization as compared to public 
firms on the Stock Market Division.
46
  Despite expectations to the 
contrary, there is no noticeable difference between the two markets in 
terms of the frequency with which shareholder proposal rights are 
exercised. 
C. Firm Size and Shareholder Proposal Rights 
For shareholders to nominate their own director or auditor 
candidates in South Korea, they have to meet a minimum ownership 
threshold.  While a general shareholder proposal right requires 3% or 
more of the aggregate voting shares, a special shareholder right sets forth 
a different holding requirement, depending on the size of the public firm’s 
paid-in capital.  That is, shareholders of public firms are usually required 
to hold, in the aggregate, 1% or more of the total number of issued shares 
with voting rights to be able to make shareholder proposals.  However, as 
aforementioned, in the case of public firms whose paid-in capital is KRW 
100 billion or more, the shareholders may exercise shareholder proposal 
rights by holding 0.5% or more of the aggregate voting shares, as long as 
                                                                                                               
 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 
U.S. 7,524 6,355 5,685 5,295 5,231 5,143 5,133 5,130 5,603 
South 
Korea 
1,308 1,409 1,518 1,563 1,573 1,620 1,694 1,767 1,798 
Listed Domestic Companies, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (last visited May 6, 2012). 
45 See Soon Suk Yoon, A Comparison of Earnings Management Between KSE Firms and 
KOSDAQ Firms, 32 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1347, 1366–68 (2005) (finding that KOSDAQ 
firms generally tend to manipulate their earnings more actively than KSE firms); Pil-Soo 
Jeon, Seong-Ho Kim & Hye-Young Jeon, Jakjeon Jeokbaltaemada ‘KOSDAQ Buhwal’ 
Chanmool [A Chilling Effect on the Revival of the KOSDAQ Market, Whenever 
Manipulations are Made], MONEY TODAY, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2007042314460157154&outlink=1 
(citing the need to reform the Korean market monitoring system in light of some firms’ 
ability to manipulate stock prices). 
46 See Yoon, supra note 45, at 1348 (noting that KOSDAQ firms are generally much 
smaller than KSE firms). 
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they have held
47
 the eligible shares for at least six months.  In this regard, 
Table 5 below shows the frequency with which shareholder proposal 
rights were exercised, according to the size of the paid-in capital of the 
relevant public firms. 
 
Table 5. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights  
Depending on the Size of Firms’ Paid-in Capital 
 
Paid-in Capital 2007 2008 2009 Total 
100 or more  
(in BB KRW) 
2 
(6.5%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(3.6%) 
Less than 100  
(in BB KRW) 
29 
(93.6%) 
45 
(95.7%) 
32 
(100.0%) 
106 
(96.4%) 
Total Number 
Instances / Year 
31 47 32 110 
 
Table 5 reveals that almost all shareholder proposals (106 out of 
110) were made in public firms whose paid-in capital was less than KRW 
100 billion.  Out of the four other shareholder proposals, two were 
exercised by labor unions against the same company and one was 
exercised by way of a control contest.  Only one shareholder proposal was 
raised by an institutional investor, which required the election of one 
auditor. 
This difference in frequency of shareholder proposals between the 
two groups indicates that the graduated eligibility requirements for 
nominating shareholders between public firms with a paid-in capital of 
KRW 100 billion or less and public firms with a paid-in capital of more 
than KRW 100 billion does not seem to be effective in facilitating the 
exercise of shareholder proposals for large firms. 
Table 6 illustrates the frequency with which shareholder proposal 
rights are exercised in corporate elections, listed by a public firm’s 
corporate asset size, in descending order. 
 
  
                                                 
47  In this context, “holding” means owning, being delegated with exercising a 
shareholder’s powers on behalf of that shareholder, or acting in concert for the purpose of 
exercising a shareholder right together.  KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 
542-6, para. 8 (S. Kor.). 
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Table 6. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
Depending on Firms’ Asset Size 
  
Asset Size  
(in MM 
USD) 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
Total 
 
Greater 
than 1,000 
1 
(3.2%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
0  
(0.0%) 
3 
(2.7%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
900 – 
1,000 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.9%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
800 – 900 
0  
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
700 – 800 
1 
(3.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.9%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
600 – 700 
2 
(6.5%) 
3 
(6.4%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(4.6%) 
(Elected) 
1 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
1 
(20.0%) 
500 – 600  
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%)  
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
400 – 500 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
3 
(2.7%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(-) 
1 
(100.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
300 – 400 
2 
(6.5%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
5 
(4.6%) 
(Elected) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(50.0%) 
1 
(20.0%) 
200 – 300 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(6.4%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
5 
(4.6%) 
(Elected) 0 0 0 0 
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Asset Size  
(in MM 
USD) 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
Total 
 
(-) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) 
100 – 200 
2 
(6.5%) 
8 
(17.0%) 
5 
(15.6%) 
15 
(13.6%) 
(Elected) 
1 
(50.0%) 
1 
(12.5%) 
1 
(20.0%) 
3 
(20.0%) 
Less than 
100 
23 
(74.2%) 
28 
(59.6%) 
21 
(65.6%) 
72 
(65.5%) 
(Elected) 
7 
(30.4%) 
13 
(46.4%) 
3 
(14.3%) 
23 
(31.9%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
 
Conversion Rate Assumption — The base foreign exchange rate as of the end of 
an immediately preceding year is applied (i.e., 1 USD = KRW 929.6 for 2007, 
KRW 938.2 for 2008, and KRW 1,257.5 for 2009, respectively). 
 
* * * 
 
It is noteworthy that most shareholder proposals were made for 
small public firms with assets valued at less than USD 100 million.  In 
particular, there were only three shareholder proposals for two public 
firms with assets exceeding USD 1 billion during the entire research 
period.  Out of the three proposals, two shareholder proposals were made 
for the same firm by its labor union.  Shareholder proposal rights for 
public firms with USD 200 million or less of total assets constituted about 
seventy-nine percent of all shareholder proposals for corporate elections 
exercised during the research period. 
Furthermore, of the public firms belonging to what the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission—the equivalent of the U.S. Fair Trade 
Commission—designated on April 1, 2010 as the fifty-three largest 
business groups, only one public company was subject to shareholder 
proposal rights during the research period.  Even in that case, the 
company’s labor unions initiated shareholder proposals twice for 
corporate elections in order to elect labor-friendly nominees to the board 
of directors (see Appendix, Table 2).  Both times, however, labor unions 
did not obtain support from other shareholders.  This result indicates that 
shareholder proposal rights are not an effective method for addressing the 
dissatisfaction of general shareholders of large public firms, especially in 
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the so-called chaebols,
48
 which are large Korean corporate groups 
controlled by family members. 
Table 7 below shows the frequency with which shareholder 
proposal rights were exercised, depending on the size of the relevant 
public firms’ net assets. 
 
Table 7. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
Depending on Firms’ Net Asset Size 
 
Net Asset 
Size             
(in MM 
USD) 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Greater 
than 1,000 
1 
(3.2%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
(Elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
600 – 1,000 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
(Elected) 0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(-) 
500 – 600  0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
(Elected) 0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
400 – 500 0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.9%) 
(Elected) 0 
(-) 
1 
(100.0%) 
0 
(-) 
1 
(100.0%) 
300 – 400 2 
(6.5%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
5 
(4.6%) 
(Elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
200 – 300 1 
(3.2%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(2.7%) 
(Elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(-) 
0 
(0.0%) 
                                                 
48 The definition and scope of chaebols is not entirely clear.  For a general description of a 
chaebol, see Jeong-Pyo Choi & Thomas G. Cowing, Diversification, Concentration and 
Economic Performance: Korean Business Groups, 21 REV. INDUS. ORG. 271, 273–75 
(2002). 
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Net Asset 
Size             
(in MM 
USD) 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
100 – 200 3 
(9.7%) 
10 
(21.3%) 
6 
(18.8%) 
19 
(17.3%) 
(Elected) 1 
(33.3%) 
1 
(10.0%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
3 
(15.8%) 
Less than 
100 
24 
(77.4%) 
29 
(61.7%) 
25 
(78.1%) 
78 
(70.9%) 
(Elected) 8 
(33.3%) 
13 
(44.8%) 
3 
(12.0%) 
24 
(30.8%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
Notes to Table 7: 
 
Conversion Rate Assumption — The foreign exchange rate as of the end of an 
immediately preceding year of the date when a relevant shareholder meeting takes 
place is applied (i.e., 1 USD = KRW 929.6 for the shareholder proposals at a 
shareholder meeting in 2007, KRW 938.2 for 2008, and KRW 1,257.5 for 2009, 
respectively). 
 
* * * 
 
When one views the distribution of shareholder proposals based 
on a firm’s net asset size, one notices that firms with smaller net assets 
have also tended to receive considerably more shareholder proposals for 
corporate elections.  For example, approximately eighty-eight percent of 
all shareholder proposals were made for public firms with net assets of 
USD 200 million or less. 
There are several possible explanations for this concentration of 
shareholder proposals in small public companies.  First, perhaps the 3% or 
1% ownership threshold
49
 remains too low to deter unnecessary exercise 
of shareholder proposal rights, especially for small companies.
50
  
Shareholders may hold the minimum shares required to exercise 
                                                 
49  Public disclosures on DART and KIND do not usually show whether shareholder 
proposals were exercised based upon a general shareholder proposal right or a special 
shareholder proposal right. 
50 See Letter from Professors at Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Secretary of the SEC, on Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations 
(Aug. 13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-164.pdf 
(asserting that ‘[t]he 1% threshold for share owners of large companies is too low,’ as it 
would allow for excessive contests for corporate elections, which would in turn 'distract 
boards from the real work of leading their companies’). 
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shareholder proposal rights relatively more easily, and may also find it 
easier to recruit other shareholders to make aggregate shareholding reach 
the minimum ownership requirement. 
In this regard, the election rate of shareholder proposals for public 
firms whose assets value less than USD 100 million ranks second to that 
for firms with assets of USD 400 million or more, but less than that for 
firms with USD 500 million or more in both cases.  Since shareholder 
proposals converge abnormally on small public firms, it is difficult to 
compare the election rates of public firms of different sizes directly to one 
another.  Nonetheless, the relatively high success rate of shareholder 
proposals for small firms also prevents one from reaching the conclusion 
that shareholder proposals for small firms were made more frequently 
without reasonable grounds in a disproportionately excessive way than for 
larger public firms. 
Second, small-sized firms may have relatively bad corporate 
governance or incompetent and/or dishonest directors.  This may increase 
the necessity of raising shareholder proposals in smaller firms instead of 
relatively larger firms.  It resonates with the research of the Corporate 
Governance Service in 2009, which found that public firms having more 
assets tended to have better-quality corporate governance.
51
  From another 
angle, given that the statute itself writes stricter corporate governance 
requirements for public firms with larger assets, the Corporate 
Governance Service research does not necessarily mean that larger firms 
have far less corporate governance issues creating dissatisfaction among 
shareholders. 
These two different possible explanations will lead to different 
policy choices in considering appropriate eligibility requirements. 
D. Cumulative Voting and Shareholder Proposal Rights 
Under the cumulative voting system, if two or more directors are 
scheduled to be elected at a shareholder meeting, each shareholder has the 
number of votes equal to the number of shares he or she owns times the 
number of directorships to be filled.
52
  Shareholders can distribute those 
votes among one or more candidates in any way they would like.  In South 
                                                 
51 See 2009 nyun Sangjangbeobin Jibaekoojo Pyungkakyulkwa Mit Deungkeupkongpyo 
[The Announcement of the Evaluation of Governance of Public Firms and their Corporate 
Governance Ratings in 2009], CORP. GOVERNANCE REV., Sept. 2009, at 106, available at 
http://www.cgs.or.kr/main/CGS_mainEBookIdx.asp?rPType=REV&rDType=LIST&rNo=
61&rPublicDate=20120304 (comparing governance scores of public firms and finding that 
these vary substantially depending on a firm’s asset size; for firms with assets valued at 
less than KRW one trillion, governance scores averaged 34.98%; for firms with assets 
valued at between KRW one and two trillion, 41.78%; and for firms whose assets valued 
over KRW two trillion, the score was 55.31%). 
52 KCC amended by Act No. 5591, Dec. 28, 1998, art. 382-2, para. 3 (S. Kor.). 
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Korea, cumulative voting is presumed unless opted out in the articles of 
incorporation of a pertinent company.
53
 
In cases where the articles of incorporation of a company do not 
exclude cumulative voting, any shareholder or group of shareholders who 
owns 3% or more of total outstanding voting shares may request that the 
company elect its directors by means of cumulative voting at a 
shareholder meeting if that shareholder meeting is convened for the 
purpose of electing two or more directors.
54
  Furthermore, shareholders of 
public firms with total assets valued at KRW 2 trillion or more may 
request cumulative voting by holding at least 1% of the total outstanding 
voting shares, instead of 3%.
55
 
Shareholders in public firms with a cumulative voting system will 
have a much greater chance of getting their own nominees successfully 
elected to the board.  Thus, it can be expected that shareholders of public 
firms adopting a cumulative voting system will be more likely to exercise 
shareholder proposal rights.  As such, the exclusion of a cumulative voting 
system may affect the exercise of shareholder proposals. 
Table 8 describes the ratio of public firms with a cumulative 
voting system subject to shareholder proposal rights for corporate 
elections.  Since a cumulative voting system only applies to the election of 
directors, shareholder proposals that nominate only auditor candidates are 
excluded from the scope of this analysis. 
 
Table 8. Cumulative Voting and Shareholder Proposal Rights 
(excluding proposals which included only an auditor candidate) 
 
Cumulative 
Voting 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Adopted 1 
(3.6%) 
6 
(18.8%) 
0 
(0%) 
7 
(7.8%) 
(Elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
0 
(-) 
3 
(42.9%) 
Excluded 27 
(96.4%) 
26 
(81.3%) 
30 
(100%) 
83 
(92.2%) 
(Elected) 9 
(33.3%) 
9 
(34.6%) 
4 
(13.3%) 
22 
(26.5%) 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at para. 1. 
55  KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-7, para. 2 (S. Kor.); the 
Presidential Decree of the KCC, art. 12 (S. Kor.). 
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Cumulative 
Voting 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Total 28 32 30 90 
 
One study from the Economic Reform Research Institute reveals 
that only 124 of 1,678 public firms (7.39%) had not excluded cumulative 
voting systems as of the end of November 2008.
56
  Assuming that the ratio 
of public firms that do not opt out from cumulative voting to those that do 
remained similar to that reported in a study by the Economic Reform 
Research Institute (taking place between 2007 and 2009), the result in 
Table 8 does not show that public firms with cumulative voting 
experienced any noticeably-greater number of shareholder proposals. 
Moreover, considering the varying frequency of shareholder 
proposals for public firms with cumulative voting systems over the 
research period, one would have difficulty concluding that the adoption of 
cumulative voting had a large influence on the decision of whether or not 
to make a shareholder proposal.  In particular, only one shareholder 
proposal was exercised for a public firm with cumulative voting in 2007, 
and none in 2009.  Furthermore, all of the public firms on the Stock 
Market Division for which shareholder proposal rights were exercised 
during the research period were firms that had excluded the cumulative 
voting system (See Table 2).
57
 
In contrast to the weak relationship between the adoption of a 
cumulative voting system and the frequency of shareholder proposals, 
once shareholder candidates were nominated, such nominees enjoyed a 
higher rate of success in being elected (i.e. 42.9% vs. 26.5%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56  See KYUNGJEKAEHYUCKYEONKOOSO [ECONOMIC REFORM RESEARCH INSTITUTE], 
JIBJOONGTOOPYOJEEUI SHILHYOSUNG BOONSUK [THE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CUMULATIVE VOTING SYSTEMS] 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.erri.or.kr/report/report_view.php?code=issue&rpt_seq=62 (stating that the 
Institute classified public firms that excluded cumulative voting systems at an annual 
shareholder meeting in 2009 as public firms without a cumulative voting system). 
57 More public firms on the KOSDAQ Market Division tend not to exclude the cumulative 
voting system than is the case with those on the Stock Market Division.  See id. at 4 
(stating that out of 117 public firms with cumulative voting systems, seventy-two firms (or 
61.5%) are listed on the KOSDAQ market, which by far exceeds the number of firms—
forty-five (or 38.5%)—that are listed on the Stock Market Division). 
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E. Purpose of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
1.  Usage of Shareholder Proposals Depending on Different 
Purposes 
Table 9 below classifies shareholder proposals for corporate 
elections exercised during the research period according to their purpose. 
 
Table 9. Purpose of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
 
Purpose 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Control Contests  22 
(71.0%) 
23 
(48.9%) 
15 
(46.9%) 
60 
(54.6%) 
(General) 20 
(64.5%) 
23 
(48.9%) 
15 
(46.9%) 
58 
(52.7%) 
(Family Dispute) 2 
(6.5%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
Nominating a Small Slate 
of Director(s)/Auditor(s) 
8 
(25.8%) 
23 
(48.9%) 
17 
(53.1%) 
48 
(43.6%) 
(Institutional Investor) 2 
(6.5%) 
16 
(34.0%)  
7 
(21.9%) 
25 
(22.7%) 
(Corporate Shareholder)  0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(6.25%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
(Individual Shareholder)  2 
(6.5%) 
5 
(10.6%) 
6 
(18.8%) 
13 
(11.8%) 
(Unknown) 4 
(12.9%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
8 
(7.3%) 
Labor Union 1 
(3.2%) 
1 
(2.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(1.8%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
Notes to Table 9: 
 
The percentage in parentheses indicates the ratio of shareholder proposals to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals for each year (organized in columns 
labeled “2007”, “2008” and “2009”) and, in the far right-hand column, to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals during the whole research period. 
 
* * * 
 
Table 9 above shows that most shareholder proposal rights were 
mainly exercised for control contests, or for the nomination of a small 
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slate of director or auditor candidates. In particular, a majority of 
shareholder proposal rights involved cases where nominating shareholders 
proposed their own nominees, ultimately to gain control power over 
public companies.  More specifically, in 2007 the ratio of shareholder 
proposals made in the context of control disputes amounted to seventy-one 
percent of all shareholder proposals.  The proportion of proposals where 
shareholders nominated a small slate of director or auditor candidates 
remained small compared to the proportion which related to attempts to 
take over corporate control during the same period, which was 25.8%. 
 It should be noted in shareholder proposals for corporate elections 
in South Korea that individual shareholders take a highly visible role in 
demanding the improvement of corporate governance or poor 
management (e.g., see thirteen shareholder proposals in Table 9).  This is 
also reflected in the phenomenon that minority individual shareholders 
often will form a club via the Internet dedicated to enhancing shareholder 
value at a specific public firm, where they exchange information and their 
opinions about the firm, and meet the management to ask that their 
requests be implemented.
58
 
 In connection with the above ratio, Table 10 below sets forth data 
relating to whether or not public companies at issue, along with 
nominating shareholders, actually conducted proxy solicitations.  The 
table also shows whether or not nominating shareholders actually relied on 
the company’s proxy materials, or whether they initiated their own proxy 
solicitations despite having access the company’s proxy card.  The 
information in Table 10 is based on the data available on DART, attained 
by checking whether the relevant companies and nominating shareholders 
filed their own proxy statements or not. 
 
Table 10. Shareholder Proposal Right and Proxy Solicitation 
 
Who Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Both 8 
(25.8%) 
18 
(38.3%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
36 
(32.7%) 
Company only 6 
(19.4%) 
6 
(12.8%) 
9 
(28.1%) 
21 
(19.1%) 
Shareholder only 4 
(12.9%) 
3 
(6.4%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
9 
(8.2%) 
                                                 
58  See, e.g., Man Ho Ahn, Soaeckjujueui Him . . . Juchongahnkeon Noko 
Kyungyoungjinkwa Pyodaekyeol [Minority Shareholder Power . . . in a Voting Contest as 
to the Agendas of a Shareholder Meeting], FN NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent0701m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=080303222800
&cDateYear=2008&cDateMonth=03&cDateDay=04 (noting that minority shareholders 
are increasingly tending to engage in collective action, especially online). 
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Who Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
None 13 
(41.9%) 
20 
(42.6%) 
11 
(34.4%) 
44 
(40.0%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
Notes to Table 10: 
 
The percentage in parentheses indicates the ratio of shareholder proposals to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals for each year (organized in columns 
labeled “2007”, “2008” and “2009”) and, in the far right-hand column, to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals during the whole research period. 
 
* * * 
 
Table 10 indicates that even though the candidates nominated 
through shareholder proposals are required to be included on a company’s 
proxy card, a large number of nominating shareholders filed their own 
proxy statement and conducted their own separate proxy solicitation.  In 
thirty-six out of fifty-seven cases (63.2%) where a company filed its own 
proxy statement, nominating shareholders also filed their own proxy 
statement.  Cases where the public company at issue solely filed its own 
proxy statement constituted only 19.1% of the total number of shareholder 
proposals exercised during the research period. 
 Table 9 and Table 10 raise the following issues about the current 
shareholder access system:  (1) the appropriateness of empowering 
nominating shareholders who seek control of the target company in order 
to take advantage of the company’s proxy card, and (2) whether or not 
current shareholder access efficiently serves the interests of dissatisfied 
shareholders who try to elect a small slate of directors (or auditors) to 
enhance the monitoring of incumbent directors or senior managers. 
2.  Shareholder Proposals for Control Contests 
Shareholder proposal rights for corporate elections in South Korea 
do not limit the number of director candidates who can be nominated by 
shareholders.
59
  Beyond that, nominating shareholders can propose 
                                                 
59 See supra note 29; Hyung Woong Song, Jujujeahnkwonhangsaeui Je Moonje [Problems 
in Exercising a Shareholder Proposal], 27 BUS. FIN. & L. 51, 56–57 (2008) (stating that a 
shareholder proposal for a corporate election is inappropriate where there has been a 
violation of presidential decrees, laws, or articles of incorporation of a company).  Unlike 
the 2010 election contest rule, the KCC does not specify any restrictions on the number or 
eligibility of director candidates nominated by shareholder proposals. 
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director nominees who are not independent from the company, their 
insiders, or major shareholders.
60
 
 As a consequence of the aforementioned factors, unless the 
articles of incorporation of a public firm state otherwise, a nominating 
shareholder may propose a full slate of director candidates constituting a 
majority of the board.
61
  This allows those involved in hostile takeovers, 
as well as shareholders who want to elect only one or two of their 
nominees, to take advantage of a company’s proxy card in order to ask for 
votes for their own nominees.  This frequent usage of shareholder 
proposals for the purpose of control contests begs the question of whether 
nominating shareholders who want to obtain control should be excluded 
from the opportunity to access a company’s proxy card. 
According to the legislative materials relating to shareholder 
proposal rights that are publicly available in the Korean National 
Assembly archives, the legislature did not pay much attention to whether 
shareholder proposal rights being used for the purpose of effecting change 
in control power should receive different treatment in connection with a 
firm’s proxy solicitations at the time of their enactment.  In contrast, the 
2010 election contest rule in the U.S. limited the scope of nominating 
shareholders’ rights only to require a company to include the greater of (i) 
one shareholder nominee, or (ii) the number of nominees that represents 
twenty-five percent of the company’s board of directors for the purpose of 
preventing shareholder proxy access from being used by shareholders to 
pursue a change of control.
62
 
In this regard, Table 11 below shows whether or not target 
companies or nominating shareholders engaged in proxy solicitations in 
the context of a control contest at the time that the shareholder proposals 
were made. 
 
Table 11. Proxy Solicitation in the Case of Control Contests 
 
Who 
Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Both Company 
and 
Shareholder 
6 
(27.3%) 
10 
(43.5%) 
6 
(40.0%) 
22 
(36.7%) 
(KOSPI) 3 1 3 7 
(KOSDAQ) 3 9 3 15 
                                                 
60 Song, supra note 59, at 56–57. 
61 Song, supra note 59, at 56–57. 
62 SEC Release: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 1, at 26. 
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Who 
Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Company only 4 
(18.2%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(20.0%) 
7 
(11.7%) 
(KOSPI) 0 0 1 1 
(KOSDAQ) 4 0 2 6 
Shareholder 
only 
4 
(18.2%) 
2 
(8.7%) 
1 
(6.7%) 
7 
(11.7%) 
(KOSPI) 2 0 0 2 
(KOSDAQ) 2 2 1 5 
None 8 
(36.4%) 
11 
(47.8%) 
5 
(33.3%) 
24 
(40.0%) 
(KOSPI) 1 2 1 4 
(KOSDAQ) 7 9 4 20 
Total 22 23 15 60 
(KOSPI) 6 3 5 14 
(KOSDAQ) 16 20 10 46 
 
Notes to Table 11: 
 
The percentage in parentheses indicates the ratio of shareholder proposals to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals for each year (organized in columns 
labeled “2007”, “2008” and “2009”) and, in the far right-hand column, to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals during the whole research period. 
 
* * * 
 
In the case of control contests, about one half of nominating 
shareholders filed their own proxy statements.  Of all cases where 
shareholder proposal rights were exercised for the purpose of control 
contests, cases where only the target companies filed proxy statements 
constituted approximately twelve percent of all of the cases.  On the other 
hand, Table 10 shows that 19.1% of nominating shareholders in general 
relied solely on the company’s proxy card to ask for other shareholders’ 
votes.  Nominating shareholders did their own proxy solicitations more 
frequently for the purpose of control contests (i.e., 48.3% in Table 11), as 
compared to the entire number of shareholder proposals involving 
shareholders’ own proxy solicitation regardless of their purpose(s) (i.e., 
40.9% in Table 10).  This result suggests that nominating shareholders 
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tended to conduct their own proxy solicitations more frequently when 
pursuing acquisition of management controlling power. 
 The above phenomenon may result from nominating shareholders 
contacting other shareholders individually to persuade them to vote for 
their nominees.  Without their own proxy solicitation, nominating 
shareholders may not engage in soliciting delegation of voting rights to 
themselves or to their designees on their own.  When seeking to obtain 
management controlling power, serious nominating shareholders usually 
are more willing to spend additional resources to try to get support from 
other shareholders in corporate elections. 
 Shareholders probably further need to obtain proxy cards 
delegated to themselves or to their designees, instead of the pro-company 
people designated in a company’s proxy card, in order to deal with 
unexpected changes at a shareholder meeting. 
 While a shareholder meeting may not resolve any agenda not 
specifically included in the notices convening the meeting,
63
 specific items 
on which to vote under a notified agenda are generally understood to be 
able to be amended by the board of directors after notices of the meeting 
have gone out, but earlier than the shareholder meeting itselfor than 
shareholders’ approval at a shareholder meeting.  For example, if a notice 
about holding a shareholder meeting includes electing directors or auditors 
on the agenda, specific candidates for directors or auditors can be changed 
prior to or at a shareholder meeting.
64
  A company also may try to adjourn 
a shareholder meeting or conduct other procedural matters at a shareholder 
meeting with shareholders’ approval. 
 To that end, a proxy card usually includes language to authorize 
proxies to vote at their reasonable discretion in cases where new or 
amended items are put to a vote.  Consequently, shareholders in pursuit of 
                                                 
63 KCC amended by Act No. 9746, May 28, 2009, art. 363, paras. 2 and 3 (S. Kor.); 
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 79Da9, Mar. 27, 1979 (S. Kor.) (deciding that a shareholder 
meeting can review and resolve only the agendas indicated when it was convened); KON 
SIK KIM ET AL., HOESABEOB [CORPORATE LAW] 96–97 (Pak Young Sa ed., 2010) (stating 
that a shareholder meeting can review and resolve only the agendas included in its 
convening notice). 
64 The permissibility of changing specific items may lead to surprising resolutions that 
absent shareholders may not have expected.  Permissibility of these changes can be 
especially problematic in electing directors and auditors, considering the importance of the 
identities of specific directors or auditors in corporate elections.  Chang Won Lee, Dong 
Kon Lee & Yi Jin Yoon, Kyungyoungkwon Datoomkwa Kwanlyeonhan 
Wiimjangdaekyeolaeseoeui Shilmoosang Je Moonje [Practical Problems in Conducting 
Proxy Fights in Connection with Control Contests] 27 BUS. FIN. & L. 32, 45–47 (2008).  
To mitigate this problem in corporate elections, the KCC was amended to stipulate that 
public firms be required to elect directors or auditors only from the candidates included in 
the notices or public announcements made in convening the shareholder meeting, which 
amendment has been effective as of February 4, 2009.  KCC amended by Act No. 9362, 
Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-5 (S. Kor.). 
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taking over the control power often like to conduct their own proxy 
solicitation regardless of whether there is access to a company’s proxy 
solicitation. 
3.  Shareholders Nominating a Small Slate of Director or 
Auditor Candidates 
Beyond the issue of frequent shareholder access for the purpose of 
control contests, the shareholders that nominated only a small slate of 
director or auditor candidates also turned out to conduct their own proxy 
solicitations separately for the purpose of asking other shareholders to 
delegate voting power to them, in many cases. 
 
Table 12. Proxy Solicitation in the Case of Nominating a Small Slate 
of Director or Auditor Candidates 
 
Who 
Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Both 2 
(25.0%) 
7 
(30.4%) 
4 
(23.5%) 
13 
(27.1%) 
(Institutional) 1 
(50.0%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
3 
(42.9%) 
10 
(40.0%) 
(Individual) 1 
(50.0%) 
1 
(20.0%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
3 
(23.1%) 
Company only 1 
(12.5%) 
6 
(26.1%) 
6 
(35.3%) 
13 
(27.1%) 
(Institutional) 0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(31.3%) 
2 
(28.6%) 
7 
(28.0%) 
(Individual) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
3 
(23.1%) 
Shareholder 
only 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(4.4%) 
1 
(5.9%) 
2 
(4.2%) 
(Institutional) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(6.3%) 
1 
(14.3%) 
2 
(8.0%) 
(Individual) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0%) 
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Who 
Conducted 
Proxy 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
None 5 
(62.5%) 
9 
(39.1%) 
6 
(35.3%) 
20 
(41.7%) 
(Institutional) 1 
(50.0%) 
4 
(25.0%) 
1 
(14.3%) 
6 
(24.0%) 
(Individual) 1 
(20.0%) 
4 
(80.0%) 
2 
(33.3%) 
7 
(53.9%) 
Total 8 23 17 48 
(Institutional) 2 16 7 25 
(Individual) 2 5 6 13 
 
Notes to Table 12: 
 
The percentage in parentheses indicates the ratio of shareholder proposals to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals for each year (organized in columns 
labeled “2007”, “2008” and “2009”) and, in the far right-hand column, to the 
entire number of shareholder proposals during the whole research period.  The 
percentages in parentheses for “Institutional” or “Individual” rows are the ratios 
of shareholder proposals involving proxy solicitations, to shareholder proposals 
exercised by institutional shareholders or individual shareholders. 
 
* * * 
 
Table 12 shows that, even in the case of nominating a small slate 
of director or auditor candidates, many shareholders solicited proxies 
separately, although that percentage (i.e., 31.3%) is lower than that of 
shareholders’ proposals for control contests (or 48.3% in Table 11).  In 
particular, institutional shareholders pursued their own proxy solicitation 
in forty-eight percent of the total shareholder proposals that they initiated 
for the purpose of nominating a small slate of director or auditor 
candidates.  Even when a target company made its proxy solicitation, 
nominating institutional investors initiated their own proxy solicitation in 
half of all cases (thirteen out of twenty-six). 
 In the case of shareholder proposals exercised by individual 
shareholders, neither target companies nor nominating shareholders made 
proxy solicitations in a majority of cases (53.9%).  Nonetheless, 
nominating shareholders still commonly do not solely rely on proxy 
access to a company’s proxy card.  Individual investors also submitted 
2012] SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA        293      
 
their own proxy materials in half of all cases (three out of six), even when 
target companies made proxy solicitations.  
 This result naturally is followed by the question of why 
nominating shareholders feel the strong necessity to file their proxy 
statements and send their proxy cards to other shareholders separately, 
when seeking the election of a small slate of directors or auditors.  As in 
the case of control contests, nominating shareholders may want to contact 
other shareholders individually to persuade them to vote for their 
nominees and to obtain proxies directed to the people designated by 
nominating shareholders themselves. 
 This leads to another question:  whether or not the current 
shareholder access to a company proxy card should be reconsidered, to 
further facilitate the shareholder franchise by reducing the necessity of 
separately engaging in proxy solicitation, especially for shareholder 
proposals to nominate merely a small number of directors or auditors. 
 From a different point of view, these statistics may imply that the 
costs of proxy solicitations in South Korea are relatively more bearable 
than in the United States.  One article refers to a 2001 Bloomberg Markets 
research report noting that in the United States, shareholder-sponsored 
proxy contests cost around USD 6.2 million on average.
65
  While it is 
recognized that proxy solicitations also place burdensome costs on 
solicitors in South Korea,
66
 it is difficult to find relevant information about 
the resulting costs that shareholders bear.
67
  While not confirmed, one 
would guess that the costs may be lower in South Korea than in the United 
States, considering that even individual minority shareholders have 
engaged in their own proxy solicitations for nominating a small slate of 
directors or an auditor in a few cases. 
F. Types of Directors Nominated by Shareholders 
Unlike the 2010 election contest rule in the U.S., the shareholder 
proposal and shareholder access system in South Korea does not restrict 
the qualification of nominees.  Thus, shareholders may nominate a non-
                                                 
65 Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal 
for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 300 (2003). 
66 See KON SIK KIM & SUN SEOP JUNG, JABONSHIJANGBEOB [THE FISCMA] 261 (Doo Sung 
Sha ed., 2009) (pointing out that proxy solicitations incur considerable costs, including 
those associated with preparing, printing and delivering proxy statements and proxy cards). 
67  Hwa-Jin Kim, Kieup Kyungyoungkwon Shijangkwa Hedge Fund [The Market for 
Corporate Control and the Hedge Fund], 48 SEOUL NAT’L U. BUB-HAK 236, 257 (2007) 
(pointing out that there has not been serious discussion about the costs of proxy solicitation 
in South Korea, and indicating that there have been no known cases where any shareholder 
has argued to be reimbursed for the costs he or she incurred to conduct a proxy 
solicitation). 
294 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
outside director as well as an outside director or an auditor.
68
 
Table 13 below shows the types of directors and auditors 
nominated through shareholder proposals.  Given the auditor’s role of 
surveillance over the board of directors and the individual directors’ 
performance as well as audits of company accounts, auditors are classified 
in the same way as outside directors. 
 
 
                                                 
68 An outside director is a statutory term for a director who is not involved in the day-to-
day business of a company and meets additional requirements with respect to their 
independence under the KCC.  KCC amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-8, 
para. 2 (S. Kor.) enumerates specific cases that disqualify an individual from serving as 
outside director of a public firm, including:  (1) a person who is a full-time director or 
employee of the company or who has worked as a full-time director, auditor or employee 
for the company within the preceding two years; (2) in the case where the largest 
shareholder is a natural person, the largest shareholder of the company and his or her 
spouse and lineal ascendant and descendant; (3) in the case where the largest shareholder is 
a corporate entity, a director, an auditor or an employee of the entity; (4) the spouse and 
lineal ascendant and descendant of a director or an auditor of the company; (5) a director, 
auditor or employee of a parent company or a subsidiary of the company; (6) a director, 
auditor or employee of a corporation that has an important business relationship with the 
company; (7) a director, auditor or employee of a corporation in which a director or an 
employee of the company is a director; (8) a minor, an incompetent person or a quasi-
incompetent person; (9) a bankrupt person who has not been reinstated; (10) a person who 
has been sentenced to imprisonment-without-prison-labor or heavier punishment, where 
two years have not elapsed since the conclusion of the execution of such punishment or 
since a final judgment was rendered directing that the punishment on such person not be 
executed; (11) a person who was discharged or dismissed from a public firm for violating 
the FISCMA and other specific laws, where two years have not elapsed since the date of 
such discharge or dismissal; (12) the largest shareholder of the company, and any person 
having a special relationship with the largest shareholder; (13) a major shareholder (i.e. a 
person who virtually owns 10% or more of the outstanding shares with voting rights—
regardless of under which name the shares have been registered—or a person who has de 
facto control over the major business matters of the company) of a company and that 
person’s spouse and lineal ascendant and descendant; (14) a person who is a full-time 
director or employee of the company or its affiliate, or who worked as a full-time director 
or employee for the company or its affiliate within the preceding two years; (15) a spouse 
or lineal ascendant and descendant of a full-time director of the company; (16) a person 
who is a full-time director or employee of a corporation that has an important business 
relationship with the company, or a competitive or cooperative relationship with the 
company, or who was a full-time officer or employee for such corporation within the 
preceding two years; (17) a full-time director or employee of a corporation in which a full-
time director or employee of the company is a non-standing director; (18) a person who 
holds the office of an outside director, non-standing director, or non-standing auditor of 
two or more other public firms; (19) an attorney-at-law, certified public accountant, 
certified tax accountant, or other professional who is providing professional services to the 
company based on relevant agreements; (20) a person who holds one percent or more of 
the total number of shares issued by the company; or (21) a person whose balance of 
transactions with the company is KRW 100 million or more (except for standardized 
transactions conducted on the basis of general terms and conditions). 
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Table 13. Types of Directors or Auditors Nominated by Shareholder 
Proposals 
 
Types of 
Nominated 
Directors 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Outside Director/ 
Auditor Only 
6 
(19.4%) 
24 
(51.1%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
40 
(36.4%) 
Including  
Non-Outside  
Director 
25 
(80.7%) 
23 
(48.9%) 
22 
(68.8%) 
70 
(63.6%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
Somewhat in line with the frequent use of shareholder proposal 
rights for the purpose of control contests, a majority of shareholder 
proposals included the nomination of non-outside directors.  Whether the 
inclusion of a non-outside director candidate is appropriate should be 
discussed in conjunction with the permissibility of shareholder access in 
the case of control contests. 
G. Stock Ownership and Shareholder Proposal Rights 
While the election of directors and auditors in principle requires 
consent of a majority of voting shares present at a shareholder meeting, 
and a quarter or more of the total number of the voting shares, shareholder 
proposals were exercised even in public firms that have a controlling 
shareholder who possesses more than a majority of voting shares (see 
Table 14 below). 
 
Table 14. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
Depending on Shareholder Ownership Structure of Target Firms 
 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Group 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
50 – 100% 
1 
(3.2%) 
6 
(12.8%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
9 
(8.2%) 
40 – 50% 
4 
(12.9%) 
3 
(6.4%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
9 
(8.2%) 
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Largest 
Shareholder 
Group 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
30 – 40% 
6 
(19.4%) 
6 
(12.8%) 
8 
(25.0%) 
20 
(18.2%) 
20 – 30% 
7 
(22.6%) 
14 
(29.8%) 
7 
(21.9%) 
28 
(25.5%) 
10 – 20% 
8 
(25.8%) 
16 
(34.0%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
34 
(30.9%) 
 0 – 10% 
5 
(16.1%) 
2 
(4.3%) 
3 
(9.4%) 
10 
(9.1%) 
Total 31 47 32 110 
 
The fact that shareholder proposals were exercised even in public 
firms having a controlling shareholder seems to largely result from certain 
voting restrictions on electing an auditor, namely, that:  (i) no shareholder 
may exercise his or her voting rights over 3%, and (ii) the largest 
shareholder of a public firm and its specially-related persons may only 
exercise their voting rights up to 3% in the aggregate.
69
 
Table 15 below shows the frequency of shareholder proposals for 
corporate elections, which excludes shareholder proposals containing only 
an auditor candidate.  This reveals that shareholder proposals other than 
those for nomination solely of auditor candidates were hardly exercised in 
public firms that have controlling shareholders (only two during the 
research period).  On the other hand, the statutory restriction on the voting 
rights of major shareholders appears, to some extent, to effectively 
encourage minority shareholders to nominate their auditor candidates in 
spite of the existence of a controlling shareholder. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69  KCC amended by Act No. 3724, Apr. 10, 1984, art. 409, para. 2 (S. Kor.); KCC 
amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-12, para. 3 (S. Kor.).  Public firms with 
total assets valued at KRW 2 trillion or more have to establish audit committees.  KCC 
amended by Act No. 9362, Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-11, para. 1 (S. Kor.); the Presidential 
Decree of the KCC, art. 16, para. 1 (S. Kor.).  There are similar restrictions on voting 
rights for electing directors who are supposed to be members of their audit committees.  
KCC amended by Act No. 9362,  Jan. 30, 2009, art. 542-12, paras. 3–4 (S. Kor.).  However, 
considering the size of total assets of public firms that were subject to shareholder 
proposals for corporate elections (see Table 6), the influence of such voting restrictions 
might not be substantial. 
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Table 15. Frequency of Exercising Shareholder Proposal Rights 
Depending on Shareholder Ownership Structure of Target Firms 
(excluding shareholder proposals nominating only an auditor 
candidate) 
 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Group Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
50% – 100% 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(6.7%) 
2 
(2.2%) 
40% – 50% 
3 
(10.7%) 
1 
(3.1%) 
1 
(3.3%) 
5 
(5.6%) 
30% – 40% 
6 
(21.4%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
7 
(23.3%) 
17 
(18.9%) 
20% – 30% 
6 
(21.4%) 
12 
(37.5%) 
7 
(23.3%) 
25 
(27.8%) 
10% – 20% 
8 
(28.6%) 
13 
(40.6%) 
10 
(33.3%) 
31 
(34.4%) 
 0% – 10% 
5 
(17.9%) 
2 
(6.3%) 
3 
(10.0%) 
10 
(11.1%) 
Total 28 32 30 90 
 
Table 16 below shows the frequency and success rate of 
shareholder proposals submitting auditor candidates (including proposals 
nominating both director and auditor candidates). 
 
Table 16. Shareholder Proposals for an Auditor Election Depending 
on Shareholder Ownership Structure 
 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Group 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
 50% – 100% 1 6 0 7 
(elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
0 
(-) 
1 
(14.3%) 
40% – 50% 3 2 2 7 
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Largest 
Shareholder 
Group 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
(elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(14.3%) 
30% – 40% 2 3 4 9 
(elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
20% – 30% 2 5 3 10 
(elected) 1 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(10.0%) 
10% – 20% 5 10 7 22 
(elected) 2 
(40.0%) 
2 
(20.0%) 
1 
(14.3%) 
5 
(22.7%) 
 0% – 10% 2 1 2 5 
(elected) 0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
Total 15 27 18 60 
(elected) 3 
(20.0%) 
4 
(14.8%) 
1 
(5.6%) 
8 
(13.3%) 
 
 
Notes to Table 16: 
 
The election ratio is calculated based on cases where shareholder auditor 
candidates were elected, regardless of whether shareholder director candidates 
were chosen. 
 
* * * 
 
 Out of 110 shareholder proposals, sixty proposals included one or 
more auditor candidates, but only eight proposals for auditor candidates 
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(13.3%) were approved at a shareholder meeting.  This success rate is 
much lower than the rate of the election of nominated directors or auditors 
as a whole (25.5%) (see Table 17 below). 
 
Table 17. Success Rate of Shareholder Proposals Depending on 
Shareholder Ownership Structure 
 
Largest 
Shareholder 
Group 
Ownership 
2007 2008 2009 Total 
Greater than 50% 0.0% 
(0/1) 
16.7%  
(1/6) 
0.0%  
(0/2) 
11.1% 
(1/9) 
 40% – 50% 25.0% 
(1/4) 
66.7% 
(2/3) 
0.0% 
(0/2) 
33.3% 
(3/9) 
30% – 40% 16.7% 
(1/6) 
33.3% 
(2/6) 
12.5% 
(1/8) 
20.0% 
(4/20) 
20% – 30% 28.6% 
(2/7) 
28.6% 
(4/14) 
 0.0% 
(0/7) 
21.4% 
(6/28) 
10% – 20% 62.5% 
(5/8) 
31.3%  
(5/16) 
20.0% 
(2/10) 
35.3% 
(12/34) 
Less than 10%  0.0% 
(0/5) 
50.0% 
(1/2) 
33.3% 
(1/3) 
20.0% 
(2/10) 
Total 29.0% 
(9/31) 
31.9% 
(15/47) 
12.5% 
(4/32) 
25.5% 
(28/110) 
 
Minority shareholders usually exercise greater influence on the 
election of auditors due to the voting restriction on block-holding 
shareholders stated above.  For this reason, minority shareholders should 
have a better chance of electing their own auditor candidates, even in 
public firms that have controlling shareholders, if those minority 
shareholders get sufficient support from other shareholders. 
 On the other hand, that each minority shareholder will also be 
subject to a 3% voting right restriction can be a deterring factor that 
prevents minority shareholders from exercising greater voting rights by 
purchasing large blocks of voting shares.  Minority shareholders (i.e., who 
are not the largest shareholder) may, however, get around the voting right 
restriction by acquiring voting shares through a separate entity, since the 
voting restriction on members of an affiliated shareholder group, who are 
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taken altogether, only applies to the largest shareholder and its affiliates.  
Consequently, this lower success rate of shareholder proposals for an 
auditor election creates the suspicion that shareholder proposal rights for 
an auditor election, in conjunction with the voting restriction, generate 
excessive shareholder proposals, thereby causing excessive managerial 
distraction. 
IV. RETHINKING THE CURRENT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL 
RIGHTS AND PROXY ACCESS 
A. Adjusting Eligibility Requirements for Shareholder Proposals 
and Access 
1.  Questions Regarding the Current Eligibility Requirements 
The fact that frequency of shareholder proposals is dependent on 
the size of paid-in capital, total assets, or net assets (see Tables 5, 6 and 7) 
and the concentration of stock ownership (see Tables 14 and 15) together 
show that the size of target companies matters more than the degree of 
ownership concentration in accounting for whether or not shareholders 
decide to make shareholder proposals.  Furthermore, the current two-layer 
shareholding requirement based on the size of the paid-in capital of public 
firms under the special shareholder proposal right does not seem to work 
effectively to encourage shareholders of large public firms to nominate 
their own candidates in order to improve their monitoring power. 
 While the reason for a higher concentration of shareholder 
proposals in small public firms as compared to large public firms is not 
entirely clear, this finding casts doubt on whether the current minimum 
shareholding requirement in South Korea sets an unduly high threshold for 
large public firms or an unduly low threshold for small public firms. 
2.  The Standard for Gradated Shareholding Requirements 
A special shareholder proposal right requires a different degree of 
minimum ownership threshold according to the size of a public firm’s 
paid-in capital.  This varying shareholder requirement seems to take into 
account that the shareholders of large public firms will have relatively 
greater difficulty satisfying a minimum shareholder threshold than 
shareholders of small public firms. 
 The differences in the level of minimum thresholds aside, the 
paid-in capital amount does not seem to be an appropriate yardstick for 
setting different levels for a minimum shareholder requirement.  Paid-in 
capital is calculated by multiplying the number of total issued shares by 
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the face value of those shares.
70
  Thus, the amount of paid-in capital 
remains the same regardless of the change in market price of the share of a 
public firm or other indicators of the entire shareholders’ value of a 
company.  Accordingly, paid-in capital is not an appropriate barometer for 
representing the difficulties that shareholders of public firms face in trying 
to meet the minimum ownership threshold to qualify for exercising their 
shareholder proposal rights.  
 The size of market capitalization or net assets may be a better 
standard than paid-in capital for setting gradated minimum shareholding 
requirements.  While market capitalization can be a more accurate mark of 
how shareholders value a company, it is influenced by various other 
factors, including the general market situation, or even rumors that 
shareholder proposals will be exercised.  The size of net assets seems to 
provide a more proper basis for setting divergent eligibility requirements 
for exercising shareholder proposals.  Given the distribution of 
shareholder proposals shown in Table 7, the size of net assets of KRW 
100 billion and/or KRW 200 billion could be possible divergent points for 
setting different minimum shareholding thresholds. 
3.  The Size of a Minimum Shareholding Threshold 
Answering the question of how to set the most desirable level of a 
minimum ownership threshold involves various considerations.  It raises 
concerns about whether or not a minimum ownership threshold for 
shareholder proposal rights for corporate elections is low enough to 
motivate dissatisfied shareholders to nominate their own candidates and 
high enough to discourage trivial shareholder proposals that may not 
garner sufficient support from other shareholders.
71
 
 The subject of acceptable minimum ownership also demands 
some thought as to what level of minimum shareholding threshold will 
send a real warning to an inefficient board, and at the same time, lead 
dissatisfied shareholders to achieve real progress or resolution with the 
incumbent board, regardless of the actual result of a shareholder 
meeting.
72
  Some shareholder proposals during the research period showed 
the threatening effect of shareholder proposals, inducing incumbent 
directors to accept shareholder nominees before shareholder proposals 
actually were even put to a vote at a shareholder meeting (for example, see 
                                                 
70 Regardless of whether a corporation issues various types of shares, all the shares issued 
by one corporation shall have the same face value, determined by each company’s articles 
of incorporation. 
71 The Harvard Law School Proxy Access Roundtable 67 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 661, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539027 (illustrating the debate as to where to set the minimum 
threshold for shareholder proposal rights). 
72 Id. at 67–68. 
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No. 31 Dong-A Pharmaceutical case and No. 32 Aiins case in Table 2, and 
No. 86 Dongwon Development case in Table 3 in the Appendix). 
 It is difficult to decide the proper level of a minimum 
shareholding threshold without investigating how shareholder proposal 
rights are actually being used.  Whether or not the current minimum 
shareholding threshold is serving the above-mentioned purposes should be 
reviewed based on the actual usage of shareholder proposals for corporate 
elections. 
 The current eligibility requirements for shareholder proposals 
seem to favor the exercise of shareholder proposal rights in small firms.  
The frequent exercise of shareholder proposal rights without substantial 
grounds can be very costly to small firms, since it may force them to 
spend considerable resources to deal with proposals.  Given smaller firms’ 
relatively limited resources, the more frequent exercise of shareholder 
proposal rights at such firms may significantly impede their ordinary 
business operations. 
 It is difficult to conclude, however, that the current 3% 
requirement (for the general shareholder proposal right) or the 1% 
requirement (for the special shareholder proposal right) for small public 
firms have produced an abusive exercise of shareholder proposals, without 
first further studying whether or not public firms subject to shareholder 
proposals were actually suffering from managerial problems around the 
time that shareholder proposals were exercised.  Some firms were already 
known to have experienced serious problems, which led them to be 
delisted.
73
 
 The scarcer exercise of shareholder proposal rights at large public 
firms, in contrast, raises the question of whether or not the current 3% (a 
general shareholder proposal right) or 0.5% (a special shareholder 
proposal right) requirement for shareholders of large public firms may be 
too high to facilitate the shareholder franchise at such firms.  The 
discussion over allowing a more generous minimum shareholding 
requirement in the case of large public firms will stir up additional 
controversy about the advantages and disadvantages of shareholder 
proposals. 
 A suspicion may further arise regarding the effectiveness of 
shareholder proposals as a measure of improvement of corporate 
governance in large public firms in South Korea.  Out of the thirty largest 
corporate groups designated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission as of 
April 1, 2010, twenty have controlling family shareholders, i.e., chaebol 
                                                 
73 For relevant information about these firms, see infra notes 85, 98, 99, 101, 105, 109, 111, 
113, 114, 117, 120, 121, 122, 127, 128, 132, 136, 137, and 139 in Tables 2 and 3 in the 
appendix. 
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families.
74
  Out of the remaining corporate groups, three belonged to 
chaebol groups in the past, but became controlled by a group of financial 
institutions through debt-equity swaps during the Asian financial crisis.  
The other seven corporate groups are state-owned firms or former state-
owned firms.  Given that the exercise of shareholder proposals in those 
seven current or former state-owned firms may incur more political and 
social scrutiny, shareholders would be reluctant to make shareholder 
proposals at those firms. 
 Taking into account the ownership structure of large public firms, 
one may argue that shareholder proposals are not exercised for large 
public firms not because the current minimum shareholding threshold is 
too high, but because shareholder proposals and proxy access are not 
effective in addressing the problems of corporate governance of large 
public firms in South Korea.  If a large public firm has a controlling 
shareholder, an activist shareholder may have less incentive to engage in 
the making of shareholder proposals, since the chance of their director 
nominee(s) being elected is low and the role of minority directors they 
nominate may be expected to be limited, even if elected (via a cumulative 
voting system or otherwise).  The deliberation of an appropriate minimum 
shareholding threshold for large public firms calls for further research of 
the ownership structure at such firms. 
B. Cumulative Voting and Shareholder Proposal Rights 
A nominating shareholder or group of shareholders who can 
request the application of a cumulative voting systemin other words, a 
shareholder or group of shareholders holding 3% or more of total 
outstanding voting shares, in the case of public firms with total assets of 
less than KRW 2 trillionin putting forward their own director candidates 
will have much better chances of getting their own nominees successfully 
elected to the board.
75
  This advantage of minority shareholders in 
corporate elections might be partly reflected in the difference between 
election rates of shareholders’ nominees at public firms with cumulative 
voting systems (42.9%) and at public firms without cumulative voting 
systems (26.5%) (see Table 8 above). 
A cumulative voting system allows minority shareholders to elect 
their own director candidates to the board without satisfying an ordinary 
election requirement (in principle, a majority of the voting shares present 
or represented at a shareholder meeting and a fourth or more of the total 
                                                 
74 Designation Status of Korean Corporate Groups, THE KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr/ogroup/guide/guide_01.jsp?muduCount=menu_01 (follow link 
to “Jijunghyunhwang”—or, “the Status of Designation”). 
75 See supra Section III.D. 
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number of issued shares with voting rights).
76
  This lessened voting 
requirement for corporate elections in cumulative voting systems increases 
the risk that some director nominees representing special interests can be 
elected to the board. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the cumulative voting 
system in supporting shareholder democracy require further consideration.  
From the standpoint of a nominating shareholder, it is important to have a 
cumulative voting system in conjunction with shareholder proposal rights 
because this combination increases the likelihood that a director candidate 
he or she nominates will be elected, without having first to obtain consent 
of a majority of voting shares.  Some shareholders who have exercised 
shareholder proposal rights for corporate elections have also made 
proposals to adopt cumulative voting systems to increase the chances that 
their nominees will be elected to the board.
77
  In the same vein, if the 2010 
election contest rule had been adopted in the United States, a number of 
nominating shareholders or shareholder groups might also have proposed 
adopting a cumulative voting system.  Consequently, a cumulative voting 
system may pose a challenge to the belief that a shareholder or a group of 
shareholders having their own special interests, elected as directors by a 
shareholder proposal, can be restrained by a majority voting system;
78
 a 
nominee could in theory be elected without actually obtaining the consent 
of a majority of the entire voting shares in a public firm with a cumulative 
voting system. 
C. Voting Restrictions in Auditor Elections and Shareholder 
Proposals 
The status of shareholder proposals for auditor elections creates 
the suspicion that voting restrictions in auditor elections cause 
shareholders to submit more proposals, which however tend to lack 
sufficient support among other shareholders more often than in director 
elections  (see Section III.G. and Tables 16 and 17 supra). 
Voting restrictions in auditor elections were adopted in the 1980s 
                                                 
76 In general, it is known that one may calculate the number of votes necessary to ensure 
the election of a given number of directors by the following formula: 
 
NS  =  [(ND x TS) / (TD + 1)] + one share 
 
NS:  the number of shares needed to elect the desired number of directors; 
ND:  the number of directors that a shareholder desires to elect; 
TS:  the total number of shares to be voted at the election; and 
TD:  the total number of directors to be elected. 
77  Examples include Hyundai Securities (right exercised by labor union) and SK (a 
sovereign wealth fund). 
78 For the argument that special-interest shareholders may be restrained by a majority 
voting system, see Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 720–21. 
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to ensure the fairness with which auditor’s duties are conducted, by 
discouraging large shareholders from electing an auditor under their 
control.
79
  Assuming that the current voting restrictions remain in place, 
the necessity of setting stricter eligibility requirements for shareholder 
proposals for auditor candidates should be discussed to mitigate the risk of 
excessive managerial distraction in corporate auditor elections. 
D. Control Contests and Proxy Access 
The frequent use of shareholder proposal rights during control 
contests raises concern that current applicable laws and regulations allow 
people involved in hostile takeovers to take advantage of these laws and 
regulations at the expense of other shareholders and public firms.  In 
particular, Table 11 above reveals that public firms in the KOSDAQ 
Market Division received more than three times the number of shareholder 
proposals for takeover attempts compared to firms listed on the Stock 
Market Division during the research period.  Moreover, nominating 
shareholders engaged in control contests without conducting their own 
proxy solicitations in twenty-six cases for KOSDAQ firms, but only in 
five cases for KOSPI firms.  These results are particularly drastic given 
that the number of public firms listed on the KOSDAQ Market Division 
was less than 1.5 times the number of public firms listed on the Stock 
Market Division.  This finding may be reasonably explained by the 
general fact that relatively small KOSDAQ firms have difficulties in 
tackling frequent control contests and related shareholder proposals.
80
 
To reduce the entrenchment costs of the board, shareholder 
proposals should be allowed to call for control contests as well as for the 
nomination of a small slate of directors.  The difference between levels of 
access to a company’s proxy card in control contests and nomination of 
small slates of directors and auditors also defies logic, since in both cases 
access is necessary to prevent the opportunity cost of overlooking 
competent director candidates.
81
  On the other hand, the frequent exercise 
                                                 
79  See Jae-Beom Kim, Euikyulkwonjedowa Hoisajibaeeui Kaeseon [Voting System and 
Improvement of Corporate Governance], 15 SANGSAPANLAIYOENKU [STUDY OF COURT 
DECISIONS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS] 250–51 (2003) (stating that the purpose of 
voting restrictions limiting the influence of large shareholders on the elections of auditors 
or directors who are to serve as members of an audit committee is to ensure that auditors’ 
duties are fairly administered). 
80 For an example of this difficulty, see Anup Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover 
Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
ANALYSIS 721, 725 (2003). 
81  Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations: Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 
(proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274), at 
29074 (“To the extent that a company does not include shareholder nominees for director 
in its proxy materials, thereby reducing the pool of qualified nominees, an opportunity cost 
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of shareholder proposals may cause a large degree of managerial and 
operational distraction, especially in small public firms. 
The current system does not differentiate between the exercise of 
shareholder proposals and shareholder access to a company’s proxy 
materials, and the issue of whether or not to allow shareholder access in 
South Korea has not been addressed.  The frequent usage of shareholder 
proposals in a hostile takeover context requires a policy discussion about 
whether or not the current system that enables such usage increases public 
firms’ efficiency.  To assess the benefits and costs of the current system, a 
detailed analytical study about control contest cases needs to be conducted. 
E. Need for Facilitating Shareholder Access 
Table 12 above shows that, in many cases, the shareholders who 
nominated only a small slate of director or auditor candidates conducted 
their own proxy solicitations separately for the purpose of asking other 
shareholders to delegate voting powers to them.  As discussed in Section 
III.E.3 above, this phenomenon may have various implications.  First, it 
may suggest that the current degree of shareholder access in South Korea 
is not particularly effective for the shareholder franchise.  This may result 
from the necessity of having a shareholder conduct her own proxy 
solicitation to get a proxy delegated for herself or her designees and more 
actively influence votes.  Second, it may also indicate that the costs of 
proxy solicitations are somewhat bearable in South Korea. 
To more accurately assess the need for improving the current 
shareholder access system, analysts should first evaluate the average cost 
of proxy solicitations, and second, obtain comments from shareholders 
who availed themselves of shareholder access to determine what major 
institutional or practical impediments may still exist in relying solely on a 
company’s proxy card and material. 
F. Disclosure of Sufficient Information on Nominating 
Shareholders and Nominees 
The current shareholder proposal and access system does not 
require public firms to provide detailed information in the company’s 
proxy card or material about nominating shareholders, their nominees, the 
relationships between them, or the purpose of the nominations.
82
  Thus, 
public firms have included shareholder nominees and certain information 
                                                                                                               
may be incurred by the company and thus the shareholders.  Therefore, proposed Rule 
14a–11 may reduce the opportunity costs to companies and shareholders.”). 
82 KCC amended by Act No. 5591, Dec. 28, 1998, art. 363-2 (S. Kor.); FISCMA, Act No. 
8635, Aug. 3, 2007, art. 152 (S. Kor.); The Presidential Decree of the FISCMA, art. 163, 
para. 2 (S. Kor.). 
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about the nominees in their proxy documents, but they usually have not 
included other detailed information or material that would be needed to 
accurately inform other shareholders about such shareholders’ candidates.  
Conversely, companies have sometimes included some negative 
information about the proposal shareholders and their nominees in their 
proxy materials. 
To enable other shareholders to make an informed decision based 
on reliable knowledge, due deliberation is needed as to whether 
nominating shareholders should be required to provide sufficient 
information about themselves and their nominees, public firms required to 
include such information in their proxy documentation, and whether there 
exist ways to ensure that nominating shareholders are responsible for 
material omissions or falsehoods. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article provides the first analysis of the status of shareholder 
proposals and shareholder access in South Korea for public firms whose 
notices convening a general shareholder meeting were made over the 
years 2007, 2008, and 2009.  This author has hand-collected a data set of 
shareholder proposals for corporate elections to conduct this analysis.  The 
article uses this data to shed some light on what should be done to 
improve current shareholder proposal rights and the shareholder access 
system. 
 A majority of the shareholder proposals for corporate elections in 
South Korea have been exercised in small public firms with net assets of 
less than USD 100 million.  More specifically, the data indicate that 
shareholder proposals have seldom been exercised for large public firms 
in South Korea, in particular for chaebols, or large Korean business 
groups.  It is not entirely clear whether this skewed distribution of 
shareholder proposals has resulted as a reaction to relatively poor 
corporate governance at small public firms, or from excessively low 
minimum eligibility requirements for the exercise of shareholder proposal 
rights.  Taking into account the prevailing ownership structure of large 
public firms in South Korea, this phenomenon raises a fundamental 
question of whether or not shareholder proposals for corporate elections 
can effectively address corporate governance issues in large public firms 
in South Korea. 
 Another focus of analysis should be directed to finding out 
whether shareholder proposals for corporate elections have contributed 
overall to the performance of public firms at issue, and so there is a need 
for further study of the performance of those firms where nominees were 
recommended by shareholder proposals. 
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 The data suggest that the current standard for the gradated 
shareholder eligibility requirement for shareholder proposals should be 
reconsidered.  The net asset thresholds of KRW 100 billion and/or KRW 
200 billion can provide a point of differentiation as to which firms should 
implement which eligibility requirements. 
 Having cumulative voting systems and voting restrictions in 
auditor elections entails greater risks that directors or auditors associated 
with special interests will be elected through shareholder proposals and 
shareholder access to a company’s proxy card.  This risk should be 
carefully weighed when assessing the appropriateness of cumulative 
voting systems and voting restrictions in auditor elections.  Considering 
that there have been a relatively large number of unsupported auditor 
candidate nominations, the increase of a minimum shareholding threshold 
for auditor nominations may provide a solution to the problem. 
 Additionally, a majority of shareholder proposals have been made 
for the purpose of effectuating control contests.  This fact reflects one of 
the major differences in proxy access between the 2010 election contest 
rule (which would allow the nomination of only one or a small slate of 
candidates) and the South Korean rule.  This situation invites 
reexamination of the appropriateness of allowing the same shareholder 
proposal rights and degree of access to be used for the purpose of control 
contests.  To this end, further study is necessary to assess the benefits and 
costs of shareholder proposals and shareholder access used for control 
contest purposes under the current system. 
In spite of enjoying access to a company’s proxy card, a large 
number of shareholders have submitted their own proxy statements and 
have conducted their own proxy solicitations.  This raises questions as to 
the effectiveness of the current shareholder proxy access system and the 
costs of proxy solicitations.  The considerable differences in proxy 
solicitation costs between South Korea and the United States, as well as 
the variable impact on large public firms given different stock ownership 
patterns, may explain the varying degrees of controversy over the 
adoption of shareholder proposal rights and shareholder access in the two 
countries. 
 The benefits and costs of shareholder proposals and shareholder 
access make experimentation with these systems in South Korea important.  
The findings detailed in this article regarding shareholder proposals and 
proxy access have implications both for understanding possible problems 
in shareholder proposal and access rules in the United States, and 
improving the current system in South Korea. 
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VI. APPENDIX 
 
Table 2. Cases of Shareholder Proposals for Corporate Elections in 
Companies in the Stock Market Division of the KRX (public disclosure 
of convening a shareholder meeting available between Jan. 1, 2007 and 
Dec. 31, 2009) 
(Units: KRW MM) 
 
 
                                                 
83 The Securities and Futures Commission penalized Sempio Foods in 2007 because of an 
instance of accounting fraud in fiscal year 2006.  See also infra notes 88 and 97. 
84 A court heard and decided on charges of embezzlement that were raised against directors 
in 2008. 
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
1.  HANSHIN 
MACHI-
NERY 
7/17/09 Control 
contest: a 
corporation 
shareholder 
(5.07%, 
06/30/09) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
42,949 27,397 X 10.41% 
(6/30/09) 
No Failure None 
2.  Il-dong 
Pharma-
ceutical 
6/29/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder, 
etc. 
(11.44%, 
06/15/09) 
 Election of 
2 outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
278,323 190,758 X 21.50% 
(6/15/09) 
No Failure Both 
3.  Sempio 
Foods83 
3/25/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(29.97%, 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
169,803 130,747 X 34.27% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Shareholder 
4.  Paper 
Corea84 
3/27/09 Control 
contest 
(8.45%, 
12/31/08)  
 Election of 
7 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
384,594 167,130 X 26.58% 
(3/31/09) 
No Failure Both 
310 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
5.  DAEHAN 
FLOUR 
MILLS 
3/20/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(less than 
5% as of 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
579,921 428,691 X 33.57% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Company  
6.  Whan In 
Pharm 
3/20/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(8.21%, 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
107,580 97,843    X 18.63% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
7.  Chokwang 
Leather 
3/20/09 An 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
106,847 90,147 X 20.6% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
8.  Tae Won 
Mulsan 
3/17/09 Control 
contest: a 
corporate 
shareholder 
(w/ tender 
offer) 
(6.25%, 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
35,930 26,076 X 36.00% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
9.  Hankook 
Cosmetics 
3/06/09 Control 
contest: a 
corporate 
shareholder 
(18.96%, 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
148,050 125,773 X 35.07% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
10.  Hae In 1/22/09 Control 
contest (w/ 
tender 
offer) 
(13.72%, 
12/30/08) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
144,761 84,780 X 28.87% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Company 
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Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
11.  KOJE
85 1/19/09 A corporate 
shareholder
: the largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
37,191 21,964 X 25.13% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
12.  Seoul Food 
Industrial 
8/11/08 Control 
contest 
(11.51%, 
7/01/08) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
31,177 21,145 X 15.35% 
(6/30/08) 
No Failure 
(Not 
addres-
sed) 
Both 
13.  SG 
Choong-
nam 
Spinning 
(formerly 
SG Global) 
7/22/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder  
 Election of 
1 auditor 
166,659 152,312 X 74.93% 
(6/30/08)  
No Failure Company 
14.  Hyundai 
Securities 
5/30/08 Labor 
union 
 Election of 
2 outside 
director 
8,900,288 2,259,166 O 23.16% 
(3/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
15.  SG 
Choong-
nam 
Spinning 
(formerly 
SG Global) 
4/22/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(7.68%, 
4/18/08) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
166,659 152,312 X 77.66% 
(3/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
16.  CHIN 
HUNG 
INTERNA-
TIONAL 
3/26/08 Control 
contest: 
among the 
largest 
shareholder 
group  
 Election of 
6 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
634,636 164,331 X 19.53% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
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85 KOJE was delisted on April 23, 2010 because of an outside auditor’s objection to giving 
an opinion. 
86 Daehan Flour Mills successfully prevented the shareholder’s proposal from being put to 
a vote by amending its articles of incorporation to limit the number of auditors. 
87 See supra note 86. 
88 The Securities and Futures Commission penalized Sempio Foods in 2007 because of 
accounting fraud in the fiscal year of 2006.  See also supra note 83 and infra note 97. 
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
17.  Sambu 
Constru-
ction 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
867,483 340,544 X 24.39% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Company 
18.  Dong Yang 
Express 
Bus 
3/28/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
97,274 82,265 X 53.81% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Company 
19.  Daehan 
Flour Mills 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.09%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
639,387 489,611 X 31.93% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure86 Both 
20.  An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.36%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
Failure87 Company 
21.  LIVART 
FURNI-
TURE 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.12%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
209,550 106,734 X 24.76% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
22.  Byucksan 
Enginee-
ring & 
Constru-
ction 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.3%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
1,014,041 323,590 O 58.7% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
23.  Sempio 
Foods88 
3/19/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(29.97%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
142,218 126,712 X 31.46% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
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89 Hankuk Electric Glass voluntarily delisted its shares on January 28, 2011. 
90 Even though the largest shareholder alone held a majority of voting shares, the activist 
corporate governance fund was able to succeed in electing its auditor nominee due to a 
voting restriction in an auditor election. 
91 See supra note 84. 
92 This shareholder proposal was exercised in the course of disputes within the controlling 
shareholder family.  Since the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder group in a 
periodic report overstates the amount of shareholding by including shareholding of the 
entire family (especially, the family members who initiated shareholder proposals and 
proxy solicitations to challenge the management rights of the other family members), the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder group in the table is instead derived from the 
proxy solicitation statement filed by the firm. 
93 The CEO held 43.99% of the voting shares at that time. 
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
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Shareholder 
Proposal 
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Asset 
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Capital 
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holder 
(incl. 
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Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
24.  Sungjee 
Constru-
ction 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.11%, 
03/05/08) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
365,661 187,832 X 14.31% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
25.  Hankuk 
Electric 
Glass89 
3/17/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(3.75%, 
01/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
442,654 430,050 X 51.47% 
(12/31/07) 
No Success90 Shareholder 
26.  Paper 
Corea91 
2/18/08 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
8 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
277,599 107,800 X 25.40% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
27.  Dong-A 
Pharmaceu-
tical 
10/31/07 Family 
dispute 
(16.18%, 
10/19/07) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 3 
outside 
directors 
594,319 317,552 X 6.87%92 
(10/11/07) 
No Failure Both 
28.  Oyang 9/14/07 Control 
contest :bet
ween CEO 
and the 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
6 non-
outside 
directors 
and 3 
outside 
directors 
94,740 9,997 X 47.63%93 
(9/30/07) 
No Success Both 
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94 This shareholder proposal was exercised in the course of disputes within the controlling 
shareholder family.  Since the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder group in a 
periodic report includes the entire family’s shareholding, a part of this equity portion needs 
to be excluded from the shareholding of the largest shareholder and its related persons. 
95  The success resulted from the conclusion of an agreement between the nominating 
shareholder and the management before the shareholding meeting.  Dong-Yoon Kim, 
Kangshinho Hoichang “Chanam Tateutake Majihaketa” [Chairman Shin-ho Kang said “I 
will Warmly Welcome my Second Son”], THE KOREA ECONOMIC DAILY, Mar. 26, 2007 (S. 
Kor.), 
http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2007032639561&sid=0104&nid
=004&ltype=1. 
96 The shareholders’ proposal was approved as amended by nominating shareholders at a 
shareholder meeting.  Four directors were elected. 
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
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holder 
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Shareholder 
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(incl. 
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Cumu-
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Voting 
Results Proxy 
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29.  Aiins 
(formerly 
Bestech-
com 
Holdings) 
8/03/07 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
6 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor  
58,876 31,344 X 25.43% 
(7/07/07) 
No Success Shareholder 
30.  Hyundai 
Securities 
5/25/07 Labor 
union 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
7,752,529 1,518,752 O 23.84% 
(6/30/07) 
No Failure Company 
31.  Dong-A 
Pharmaceu-
tical 
3/29/07 Family 
dispute 
(18.44%, 
03/13/07) 
 Election of 
2 outside 
directors 
594,319 319,157 X 15.56%94 
(12/31/06) 
No Success95 Both 
32.  Aiins 
(formerly 
Bestech-
com 
Holdings) 
4/11/07 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors  
58,876 31,344 X 11.75% 
(3/31/07) 
No Success96 Shareholder 
33.  Art One 
Paper 
(formerly 
EN PAPER 
MFG.) 
3/30/07 Control 
contest 
(21.16%, 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
658,123 277,885 O 27.12% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure None 
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Notes to Table 2: 
 
The above data has been organized and re-arranged from information extracted 
from a number of sources, mainly DART and KIND.  Please note the following: 
 
Company Name:  Shareholder proposals for corporate elections were 
classified into two groups:  (i) 37 shareholder proposals for public firms on the 
Stock Market Division of the KRX, and (ii) 73 shareholder proposals for public 
firms on the KOSDAQ Market Division of the KRX. 
 
Characteristic of Nominating Shareholder:  The information in column 
“Characteristic of Nominating Shareholder” is derived from the public notices 
convening a shareholder meeting, proxy statements filed by nominating 
shareholders, and the relevant parts of the companies’ periodic reports describing 
control disputes over the company and the exercise of shareholder proposal rights, 
which are available at DART or KIND.  If the appropriate information was not 
sufficient, other media sources such as news articles were also referenced as 
secondary resources.  Even if the section regarding control disputes in a relevant 
                                                 
97  The Securities and Futures Commission penalized Sempio Foods in 2007 due to 
instances of accounting fraud that occurred in the fiscal year 2006.  See also supra notes 83 
and 88. 
 
 
Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting 
Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
34.  Korea 
Petroleum 
Industrial 
3/30/07 A minority 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
57,252 26,390 X 27.38% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure None 
35.  Sempio 
Foods97 
3/21/07 An 
institutional 
shareholder
: a private 
equity 
(24.12%, 
12/31/06) 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director and 
1 outside 
director 
138,429 122,391 X 30.88% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure None 
36.  Dae Dong 
Industrial 
3/09/07 A minority 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
299,822 154,559 X 48.86% 
(10/31/06) 
No Failure None 
37.  A minority 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
Failure None 
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company’s periodic report does not mention the details of relevant shareholder 
proposals and control contests, some of them are classified as “control contests” if 
a nominating shareholder or a group of shareholders nominated a majority of 
directors or expressed their intention to take over control power over the target 
company through their own proxy statements (available on DART) or news 
media. 
 
 Contents of Shareholder Proposal:  The column titled “Contents of 
Shareholder Proposal” is mainly derived from the public notices convening a 
shareholder meeting, available on DART. 
 
 Asset:  The “Asset” column shows the size of assets of a company based 
on its audited financial statement as of the end of an immediately preceding fiscal 
year to the date of a pertinent shareholder meeting, which is included in an annual 
report that is available on DART. 
 
 Net Asset:  The “Net Asset” column shows the size of net assets of a 
relevant company based on its audited financial statement as of the end of an the 
fiscal year immediately preceding the date of a pertinent shareholder meeting, 
which is included in an annual report that is available on DART. 
 
 Paid-in Capital:  The “Paid-in Capital” column shows whether the paid-
in capital of a pertinent company exceeds KRW 100 billion as of the end of an 
immediately preceding fiscal year, based on the company’s audited financial 
statement.  This information is included in an annual report that is available on 
DART.  “O” indicates that the paid-in capital of the company exceeds KRW 100 
billion; “X” indicates the company’s paid-in capital is less than KRW 100 billion. 
 
 Largest Shareholder:  The “Large Shareholder” column reflects the 
amount of the voting shares held by the largest shareholders and their specially-
related persons as defined by the FISCMA.  A public firm is required to disclose 
the status of shareholding of its largest shareholder and its specially-related 
persons in its period report, which is available on DART.  Since the shareholding 
distribution on the record date is not publicly available, this information is based 
on the most recent annual, semi-annual or quarterly report from the scheduled 
shareholder meeting date as well as a report on large-scale shareholding.  Since 
most public firms set the last date of each fiscal year as the record date for their 
annual shareholder meeting, the shareholding information as of the end of each 
fiscal year will generally show the voting rights of relevant parties if a 
shareholder meeting at issue is an annual shareholder meeting. 
 
 Cumulative Voting:  The “Cumulative Voting” column indicates 
whether or not a company at issue excludes a cumulative voting system.  The 
relevant information comes from the articles of incorporation of each researched 
company, which is attached to the most recent annual report from the date of a 
relevant shareholder meeting and available on DART. 
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 Results:  The “Results” column shows the result of voting at a 
shareholder meeting.  This information comes from the public disclosure of the 
results of shareholder meetings, which is posted on KIND. 
 
 Proxy Statement:  The “Proxy Statement” column shows whether a 
company or a shareholder, or both, used a proxy statement.  “Both” means that 
both a company and a nominating shareholder submitted their own proxy 
statement, respectively. 
“Company” or “shareholder” means that only a company or a 
nominating shareholder, or a group of nominating shareholders, submitted its 
proxy statement. 
“None” means that neither a company nor a nominating shareholder 
conducted a proxy solicitation.  Proxy Statements are disclosed on DART. 
 
* * * 
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Table 3. Cases of Shareholder Proposals for Corporate Elections in 
Companies in the KOSDAQ Market Division of the KRX (public 
disclosure of convening a shareholder meeting available between Jan. 
1, 2007 and Dec. 31, 2009) 
(Unit: KRW MM) 
 
 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
38.  NEXTECH
98 12/11/09 Control 
contest  
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director  
 Election of 
2 auditors 
49,971 44,514 X 15.41% 
(9/30/09) 
No Failure None 
39.  Stom E&F
99 
(formerly De 
Chocolate 
E&TF) 
11/12/09 Control 
contest 
(11%, 
11/02/09) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
36,818 25,619 X 3.3% 
(10/12/09) 
No Failure Shareholder 
40.  Inochip 
Technology 
06/30/09 Control 
contest: a 
venture 
capitalist 
and the 
second 
largest 
shareholder 
(35.38%) 
 Election of 
6 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
64,895 49,237 X 45.88% 
(6/30/09)100 
No Failure Both 
                                                 
98  NEXTECH was delisted later on November 26, 2011 because of the KRX’s merit 
review of its sustainability, transparency, and other factors.   
99 Stom E&F was delisted on April 13, 2011 due to the excessive impairment of its capital. 
100  The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and its related persons had been 
increased from 12.41% (03/31/09) to 45.88% (06/30/09) during a takeover dispute as a 
result of an acting-in-control arrangement between the largest shareholder and its white 
knight who purchased treasury shares from the company. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
41.  Genexel-
Sein101 
5/22/09 A group of 
individual 
shareholders 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 3 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
40,290 33,283 X 12.23% 
(5/15/09) 
No Failure Company 
42.  Jinsung T.E.C. 3/31/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(less than 
5%) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
267,000 13,257 X 43.92% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
43.  SFA 
Engineering 
3/27/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(less than 
5%) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
416,963 222,704 X 32.4% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Company 
44.  NEO MTEL 3/27/09 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder 
and others 
(19.77%) 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
24,291 23,117 X 34.33% 
(excluding 
current 
management
18.38%) 
No Failure Both 
45.  Terraum 
(formerly 
NeoWave) 
3/24/09 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
59,892 18,302 X 9.01% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Company 
                                                 
101 Genexel-Sein was delisted on April 15, 2010 because of an outside auditor’s objection 
to giving an opinion for the limited scope of the audit and the ambiguity of remaining a 
firm having going-concern value.  The group of individual shareholders are known to have 
lost their incentive to pursue the success of their shareholder proposal around the time of 
the general shareholders’ meeting after hearing the company’s public announcement to the 
effect that the largest shareholder of the company would be changed; this news caused the 
share price of the company to increase dramatically.  Jin Cheol Lee, Jukakeupdeungyi 
Kyungyoungkwonboonjaeng Jamjaewooda [The Drastic Increase in Share Price Calms 
Down Control Contests], EDAILY, May 7, 2009, 
http://cn.moneta.co.kr/Service/stock/ShellView.asp?ArticleID=2009050714360403260&Li
nkID=529. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
46.  WOOJEON & 
HANDAN 
(formerly 
HANDAN 
BroadInfo-
Com) 
3/27/09 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(11.66%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
2 outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
72,580 53,121    X 15.50% 
(12/31/08) 
No Partial 
success102 
Both 
47.  NUVOTEC 3/27/09 Not 
available 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
32,792 14,674 X 7.46% 
(12/31/08) 
No Partial 
success103 
Company 
48.  S&K Polytec 3/27/09 Three 
individual 
shareholders 
(at least 
8.35%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
37,418 33,888 X 31.40% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Company 
49.  Tong Yang 
Magic104 
3/20/09 Not 
available  
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
171,459 70,594 X 63.55% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
50.  C-motech
105 2/26/09 Control 
contest 
(10.82%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
77,580 44,958 X 21.91% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
51.  An 
individual 
shareholder 
(10.17%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 1 
outside 
director 
Failure Company 
52.  R&S 
Networks 
2/27/09 A group of 
individual 
 Election of 
5 non-
30,302 18,520 X 11.40% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure Both 
                                                 
102 One director and one auditor were elected. 
103 One director, who became a co-CEO later, was elected. 
104 Tong Yang Magic was delisted on September 4, 2011 because of its merger with Tong 
Yang.  
105 C-motech was delisted on September 23, 2010 because of an outside auditor’s objection 
to giving an opinion for the limited scope of the audit and the ambiguity of remaining a 
firm having going-concern value.  
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
share-
holders106 
(5.84%, on 
02/16/09) 
outside 
directors 
  Election 
of 1 
auditor 
53.  Young Poong 
Precision 
2/27/09 An 
individual 
shareholder 
(The largest 
shareholder, 
23.94%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
135,182 100,004 X 74.67%107 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
54.  OCI Materials 
(formerly 
SODIFF 
Advanced 
Materials)  
2/26/09 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
share-
holder108 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
393,775 172,840 X 36.77% 
(12/31/08), 
the second 
largest 
shareholder 
12.53% 
(12/31/08) 
No Success Company 
55.  NEXTECH 2/06/09 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
8 non-
outside 
directors  
49,971 44,514 X 15.41% 
(12/31/08) 
No Failure None 
56.  A corporate 
shareholder: 
the largest 
shareholder 
(15.41%, on 
12/31/08) 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
Failure None 
                                                 
106 This proposal of agenda was made in conjunction with the application for convening an 
extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting. 
107 While the largest shareholder and other co-founders’ family members held 74.67% of 
the aggregate voting shares, the largest shareholder was not able to be elected as a director 
at a shareholder meeting, since he was not able to get the support from those other co-
founders’ families. 
108 This proposal of agenda was made in conjunction with the application for convening an 
extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting. The largest shareholder commenced this 
procedure to acquire management power over the second largest shareholder and the 
existing management. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
57.  DIBOSS
109 2/05/09 Control 
contest: an 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
41,196 1,921 X 14.83% 
(12/31/08) 
No Partial 
success110 
None 
58.  Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
Failure None 
59.   VO 
INDUSTRIA
L111 (formerly 
Mora 
Resource) 
12/26/08 Control 
contest 
(5.26%, on 
12/31/08) 
  Election 
of 3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
11,577 6,777 X 33.43% 
(12/31/08) 
Yes Partial 
success112 
Both 
60.  KCP 12/05/08 Control 
contest: 
among the 
largest 
shareholder 
group 
(35.55%, on 
11/20/08) 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
27,919 7,500 X 32.64% 
(11/06/08) 
No Failure Both 
61.  Asia Media 
Holdings 
(formerly 
12/04/08 Control 
contest 
(20.59%, on 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
7,028 4,933 X 21.97% 
(12/31/08) 
Yes Failure Both 
                                                 
109 DIBOSS was delisted on October 7, 2009 according to the KRX decision because of the 
excessive impairment of its capital. 
110 Two directors were elected.  
111 VO Industrial was delisted on July 22, 2010 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
112 Five directors were elected.  
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
Eugene 
Data)113 
11/28/08) directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
62.  OullimElses 
(formerly 
Netsecure 
Technology) 
11/28/08 Control 
contest 
(22.53%, on 
11/19/08) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
32,731 26,849 X 27.79% 
(11/13/08) 
No Failure Shareholder 
63.  LuBo 
Industries 
(formerly 
Jeda 
Industries) 
9/26/08 Control 
contest 
(4.70%, on 
09/23/08) 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
directors 
38,073 21,612 X 11.62% 
(8/24/08) 
No Failure Both 
64.  Testech
114 7/25/08 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 2 
outside 
directors  
 Election of 
2 auditors 
36,655 18,374 X 13.52% 
(6/27/08) 
No Success None 
65.  Trais 
(formerly 
WINDSKY) 
7/18/08 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
27,190 2,554 X 21.42% 
(6/30/08) 
No Success None 
66.  Control 
contest 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
Partial 
success115 
None 
                                                 
113 Asia Media Holdings was delisted on November 22, 2011 because of the KRX’s merit 
review of its sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
114 Testech was delisted on November 10, 2011 because of the excessive impairment of its 
capital as well as an outside auditor’s objection to giving an opinion. 
115 One director was elected. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
and 1 
outside 
director 
67.  Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 1 
outside 
director 
Failure None 
68.  VirtualTek 7/10/08 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
42,742 40,075 X 21.49% 
(5/15/08) 
No116 Success None 
69.  LuBo 
Industries 
(formerly 
Jeda 
Industries) 
6/09/08 An 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
38,073 21,612 X 11.62% 
(5/15/08) 
No Failure None 
70.  Edu-Pass
117 5/21/08 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
29,734 17,224 X 17.50% 
(3/31/08) 
Yes118 Partial 
success119 
None 
71.  Control 
contest 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
Failure None 
72.  Control 
contest: the 
former CEO  
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
Failure None 
73.  Ceratech
120 3/31/08 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
53,448 27,939 X 36.96% 
(12/31/08) 
No Success None 
                                                 
116 Cumulative voting was excluded at the same general shareholders’ meeting, before the 
agenda for electing directors was put to a vote. 
117  Edu-Pass was delisted on June 9, 2011 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
118 Edu-Pass excluded a cumulative voting right from the articles of incorporation after this 
shareholder meeting. 
119 Two directors were elected. 
120 Ceratech was delisted on August 25, 2010 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
shareholder and 1 non-
outside 
director 
74.  SFA 
Engineering 
3/28/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(6.40%, on 
3/12/08)  
 Election of 
2 outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
377,151 202,313 X 5.6% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
75.  FUTURE 
VISION121 
3/28/08 An 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 1 
outside 
director 
9,799 (6,830) X 10.5% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
76.  Hismartech
122 3/28/08 An 
individual 
shareholder 
(1.21%, on 
03/20/08) 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
29,249 12,776 X 14.8% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
77.  Winova 
(formerly A1) 
3/28/08 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
6 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
49,085 37,014 X 12.02% 
(12/31/07) 
No Partial 
success123 
Shareholder 
78.  Actoz Soft 3/28/08 A group of 
individual 
shareholders 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
78,985 65,045    X 50.01% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure None 
79. \ LuBo 
Industries 
(formerly 
Jeda) 
3/28/08 Control 
contest: an 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
38,073 21,612 X 4.99% 
(10/09/07) 
No Partial 
success124 
Both 
                                                 
121 FUTURE VISION was delisted on April 12, 2008 due to the excessive impairment of 
its capital. 
122 Hismartech was delisted on May 10, 2010 due to the excessive impairment of its capital. 
123 The proposing shareholder suggested the revision of the list of director candidates at the 
general shareholders’ meeting, and all of such 5 director candidates as re-proposed were 
elected. 
124 One non-outside director was elected. 
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 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
80.  Sundo Soft 3/25/08 Not 
available 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
20,625 9,631    X 48.90% 
(12/31/07) 
No Success None 
81.  Hallim 
Venture 
Capital 
3/21/08 An 
individual 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
13,219 11,904 X 26.27% 
(12/31/07) 
Yes Failure None 
82. S SENIT 3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder: 
the largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
3 outside 
directors 
37,721 17,344 X 11.80% 
(12/31/07) 
No Success None 
83.  Top 
Engineering 
3/21/08 Control 
contest 
(5.94%, on 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
4 outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
93,500 81,035 X 16.46% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
84.  Webzen 3/28/08 Control 
contest 
(6.33%, on 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 5 
outside 
directors 
158,157 141,002 X 22.97% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure125 Both 
85.  Control 
contest 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
Failure Both 
86.  Dongwon 
Development 
3/21/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.93%, on 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 outside 
director 
225,368 182,273 X 41.50% 
(12/31/07) 
No Success126 Company 
87.  SVH
127 
(formerly 
3/25/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder: 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
80,023 51,283 X 16.11% 
(12/31/07) 
No Success None 
                                                 
125 Webzen bought more than 10% of the voting shares of the company which tried to take 
over its control power, depriving this company of voting rights in Webzen. 
126 This success came from the agreement between an activist fund and the management of 
Dongwon Development that had been concluded just prior to the date of a shareholder 
meeting. 
127 SVH was delisted on February 14, 2011 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors.  
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Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
ElimEdu) the largest 
shareholder 
88.  Plus Profit
128 3/17/08 Not 
available 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
4,517 1,264 X 19.18% 
(2/14/08) 
No Failure Company 
89.  VirtualTek 2/25/08 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
and 1 
outside 
director 
42,742 40,075 X 21.44%129  
(3/31/08) 
Yes Partial 
success130 
Both 
90.  Dongwon 
Development 
1/03/08 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.93%, on 
12/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
225,368 182,273 X 41.50% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Both 
91.  Hismartech 12/06/07 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
28,524 10,145 X 12.27% 
(11/14/07) 
No Partial 
success131 
Company 
92.  Kuk Young 
G&M 
12/28/07 Control 
contest: the 
former 
largest 
shareholder) 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
30,673 19,465 X 12.55% 
(12/13/07) 
Yes Failure None 
                                                 
128 Plus Profit was delisted on November 9, 2009 because of an outside auditor’s objection 
to giving an opinion for the limited scope of the audit.  
129 This figure excludes the equity held by management. 
130 One non-outside director was elected. 
131 One non-outside director was elected. 
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Date of 
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93.  Shinji Soft
132 11/30/07 Control 
contest: an 
individual 
shareholder) 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors  
19,807 18,960 X 34.40% 
(9/30/07) 
No Partial 
success133 
Company 
94.  Control 
contest: an 
individual 
shareholder) 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
Failure Company 
95.  Dae Dong 
Gear 
11/28/07 Four 
individual 
shareholders 
(2.37%, on 
11/19/07) 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
56,899 25,061 X 53.54% 
(10/31/07) 
No Failure134 Both 
96.  Terraum 
(formerly 
NeoWave) 
8/14/07 Control 
contest 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
47,184 36,392 X 6.01% 
(8/06/07) 
No Failure Company135 
97.  DVS Korea 7/31/07 Control 
contest: the 
former 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
35,833 11,183 X 11.69% 
(6/30/07) 
No Failure None 
98.  Control 
contest: the 
largest 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
Success None 
                                                 
132 Shinji Soft was delisted on February 27, 2010 because it was unable to maintain the 
minimum requirement for market capitalization. 
133 Three directors were elected. 
134 Dae Dong Gear successfully prevented the shareholder proposal from going to a vote 
by proposing the amendment to the articles of incorporation to limit the total number of 
auditors. 
135  The employee stock ownership association of the company submitted solicitation 
statements in order to solicit shareholders to delegate voting shares to the association, and 
to get these shareholders to consent to the agenda proposed by the board of directors of the 
company and object to the agenda proposed by minority shareholders. 
2012] SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RIGHTS IN SOUTH KOREA        329      
 
 Company 
Name 
Date of 
Share-
holder 
Meeting 
Characte-
ristic of 
Nomina-
ting Share-
holder 
Contents of 
Shareholder 
Proposal 
Asset  Net 
Asset 
Paid-in 
Capital 
Largest 
Share-
holder 
(incl. 
related 
persons) 
Cumu-
lative 
Voting 
Results Proxy 
Statement 
shareholder directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
99.  Trais 
(formerly 
Windsky, 
Geomento and 
Tinia Tech)  
7/30/07 Control 
contest 
(10.05%, on 
5/16/07) 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
13,092 9,129 X 40.33% 
(6/27/07) 
No Failure None 
100.  NUVOTEC 7/12/07 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
23,735 5,330 X 5.87% 
(7/08/07) 
No Failure Both 
101.  FINEDIGI-
TAL 
7/06/07 An 
individual 
shareholder 
(23.50%, on 
03/31/07) 
 Election of 
1 non-
outside 
director 
73,961 60,338 X 29.75% 
(6/30/07) 
No Failure None 
102.  GDCorp 
(formerly 
Eight 
Peaks)136 
6/20/07 Control 
contest  
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
director 
3,352 (3,147) X 22.67% 
(5/15/07) 
No Success None 
103.  Terraum 
(formerly 
NeoWave) 
3/30/07 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder 
 Election of 
4 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
47,184 36,392 X 35.14% 
(12/31/07) 
No Failure Shareholder 
104.  Control 
contest  
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
Failure None 
                                                 
136 GDCorp was delisted on June 17, 2009 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
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outside 
director 
 Election of 
2 auditors 
105.  DAHUI
137 
(formerly EG 
Greentech) 
3/16/07 Control 
contest 
(4.97%, on 
03/02/07) 
 Election of 
5 non-
outside 
directors  
 Election of 
1 auditor 
17,476 12,613 X 9.06% 
(9/30/06) 
No Failure Shareholder 
106.  BioSmart 3/27/07 Control 
contest: the 
largest 
shareholder  
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
 Election of 
1 auditor 
36,125 32,487 X 11.17% 
(12/31/06) 
No Partial 
success138 
Both 
107.  AD Motors 
(formerly 
Prosonic) 
3/23/07 Control 
contest: 
private 
equity (the 
largest 
shareholder) 
 Election of 
3 non-
outside 
directors 
28,976 23,312 X 18.46% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure Both 
108.  Sunny 
Trends139 
(formerly 
EnterOne) 
3/20/07 Not 
available 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
23,608 10,950 X 3.49% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure Company 
109.  For Nature
140 
(formerly 
KAFCO C&I) 
1/31/07 An 
institutional 
shareholder 
(5.06%, on 
01/25/07) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 1 
outside 
10,351 5,952 X 21.33% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure Both 
                                                 
137 DAHUI was delisted on October 1, 2010 because of the KRX’s merit review of its 
sustainability, transparency, and other factors. 
138 Four directors and one auditor were elected. 
139  Sunny Trends was delisted on September 4, 2009 because of an outside auditor’s 
objection to giving an opinion as well as the excessive impairment of its capital. 
140 For Nature was delisted on April 23, 2010. 
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110.  FINEDIGI-
TAL 
1/31/07 Control 
contest 
(30.57%, on 
1/03/07) 
 Election of 
2 non-
outside 
directors 
and 2 
outside 
directors 
72,179 58,651 X 30.73% 
(12/31/06) 
No Failure None 
 
Notes to Table 3: 
 
(See Table 2 for the explanations for each column.) 
 
* * * 
